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CRAZY (MENTAL ILLNESS UNDER THE ADA)
Jane Byeff Korn*
This Article examines how people with mental disabilities and mental illnesses
have been treated under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part I addresses the
history of mental illness. It argues that while beliefs about the causes and content
of mental illness have vacillated over time, the mentally ill have received consis-
tently poor treatment throughout human history. Part II addresses present
problems with the definition of mental illness, including how mental illness and
mental disability are defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Part III discusses the problems faced by people with mental illness today. The au-
thor argues the current state of the law affords little protection to persons with
mental illness, despite the existence of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part III
gives particular attention to the problems employers face, and think they face,
when trying to accommodate the mentally disabled in the workplace. Part IV ex-
amines the distinction between physical and mental disability. The author argues
that the distinction between these two categories of illness is untenable: many
"physical" disabilities have a cognitive component, and many "mental" disabili-
ties have direct physical effects. In the context of the ADA, the author argues that
the distinction is merely a font of useless litigation, and that the additional cost of
addition coverage for mental disabilities would be slight.
In Part V, the author proposes a solution: eliminating the ADA's distinctions be-
tween mental and physical disabilities. The author argues that this would reduce
the difficulties faced by the mentally disabled, and those whose disabilities are not
easily categorized as either purely mental or purely physical, while not imposing
any significant additional burden on employers.
On February 7, 2001, Robert W. Pickett fired several shots on the
South Lawn of the White House.' Mr. Pickett was shot in the leg by
the Secret Service. No one else was hurt although the incident
raised questions about security at the White House. Newspaper ar-
ticles about the incident routinely mentioned that Mr. Pickett had
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. Many
thanks to Barbara Atwood, Toni Massaro, and Gary Korn for their comments on prior drafts
of this paper and to my research assistants, Catherine Dooley, Russell Esslinger, Abbe
Goncharsky, and Matthew Parry. I also would like to thank the James E. Rogers College of
Law for the research grants that allowed me to work on this paper.
1. Mr. Pickett was sentenced to three years in prison for these acts. After accepting a
plea agreement, U.S. DistrictJudge Henry H. Kennedy recommended that Mr. Pickett serve
this term in a hospital prison. White House Shooter Sentenced, CNN.coM,July 3, 2001, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/07/31/whitehouse.shooting/index.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2003).
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a history of mental illness.2 Although many physical illnesses can
also be linked to behavioral changes,3 few news articles about simi-
lar incidents mention that the perpetrator had a "history of
physical illness." Many may assume that the reason for this is that
there is a correlation between mental illness and acts of violence
and that no such correlation exists between acts of violence and
physical illness. Yet, more than 95% of violent acts in our society
are committed by people who are not mentally ill.4 In fact, gender
(male) and age (younger) are more predictive of violence than
mental illness.5 If the statistic that 95% of violent acts are commit-
ted by non-mentally ill people is true, then what justifies the
disparate assumptions about, and treatment of, people with mental
disabilities in our society?
Reactions to people with disabilities of all kinds include fear,
pity, and admiration.6 People with disabilities are stereotyped as
needy and inferior.7 Historically our society has isolated and segre-
gated people with disabilities." Whatever stigma attaches to a
2. See, e.g., Allan Lengel, Armed Man Arrested Outside White House: Officers Find Rifles,
Pistol in Truck, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at A3; News in Brief CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 24,
Feb. 9, 2001; Matt Kelley, Man Has Troubled History, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 8, 2001, at A01;
Terence Hunt, Gunman Shot at White House Indiana Accountant Wounded in Standoff Tourists
Evacuated; Bush Never in Danger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at 1; Gunman Nabbed Outside
White House, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (DENVER), Feb. 8, 2001, at IA; White House Gunman
Passed Background Check, CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 8, 2001; Hope Yen, Stigma Remains Barrier for
Mentally Ill, Advocates Say, PITr. POST-GAZETTE, at B8, Mar. 7, 2000.
3. See, e.g., Mental-Health Parity or Parody, 39 MED. TRIB.: INTERNIST & CARDIOLOGIST
EDITION 20, (1998) (citing studies indicating that persons with rheumatoid arthritis and a
history of depression experienced more pain than those without the history and that diabet-
ics who received psychotherapy had lower levels of depression and lower blood-glucose
levels than those for whom the depression went untreated).
4. See American Psychiatric Association, Fact Sheet: Violence and Mental Illness (1998),
available at http://www.psych.org/publicinfo/violence.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter APA Fact Sheet]; see also KAN. Crrv STAR, April 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL
7728422 (quoting the statement of the American Psychiatric Association). Even in those
cases in which someone with a mental illness does commit a violent act, the causal connec-
tion is not clear, i.e., whether the mental illness caused the act of violence.
5. LIz SAYCE, FROM PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT TO CITIZEN, OVERCOMING DISCRIMINATION
AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 34 (2000) (noting that being young and male and using alcohol and
drugs are more predictive of violence than mental illness); Rohan Ganguli, M.D., Editorial,
PIrrr. POST-GAZETTE, March 18, 2000.
6. Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1103, 1003 (1998) (dis-
cussing some of the reactions to people with disabilities).
7. JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 143 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1405, 1415 (1999); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers and Civil Rights:
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physical disability, however, most scholars agree that people with
mental disabilities are more feared, more stigmatized, discrimi-
nated against more often, and are seen as more likely to commit
acts of violence than are people with physical disabilities." People
with mental disabilities are seen as shameful, dangerous, and irre-
sponsible,' °  and discrimination against people with mental
disabilities is widespread."
Studies indicate that 28% of adults in the United States have a
diagnosable mental or addictive disorder.'2 In the United States,
70-90% of persons classified as mentally disabled were unem-
ployed and not seeking work.' 3 In contrast, employment rates for
the general population indicate that 70-90% are employed."
Moreover, recent studies indicate that people with mental disabili-
ties can work, and that working may decrease symptoms.
15
While much has been written about the serious problems con-
fronting people with mental disabilities, including civil
commitment, competency determinations, the insanity defense, 7
and the right to refuse treatment,18 little attention has focused on
employment discrimination against people with mental disabilities.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' 9 enacted in 1990 to
protect people with both physical and mental disabilities, has
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1341, 1359 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Em-
ployment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 273-74
(2000); Stephanie Proctor Miller, Comment, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701, 705 (1997).
10. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 60.
11. See, e.g., Bruce G. Link et al., Stigma as a Barrier to Recovery: The Consequences of Stigma
for the Self-Esteem of People with Mental Illnesses, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1621 (Dec. 2001);
Stefan, supra note 9, at 272. Moreover, without making a distinction between kinds of dis-
abilities, the preamble to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), for example,
indicates that prior to its enactment there was widespread discrimination against the forty-
three million disabled Americans. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1) (1994).
12. RICHARDJ. BONNIE &JOHN MONAHAN, MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND
THE LAW 15 (1997).
13. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 19.
14. Id.; see also BONNIE & MONAHAN, supra note 12, at 18.
15. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 19; BONNIE & MONAHAN, supra note 12, at 25.
16. See, e.g., SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2001).
17. Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense,
The Authoritarian Spirit, The Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375
(1997).
18. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, supra note 9.
19. 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (1994).
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proven largely ineffective in the eyes of advocates of the disabled.0
Much has been written about the failure of the ADA to provide
adequate protection to people with physical disabilities, and much
of the criticism involves the definition of the term "disability" in
the statute and its interpretation by the courts.21 On the other
hand, many employers are becoming increasingly concerned about
what they see as the comprehensive reach of the ADA and the
growing threat of litigation by someone with a disability.
This Article examines how people with mental disabilities,
particularly mental illness,2 have fared under the ADA. The
difficulties caused by the problem of deciding what is a disability
under the ADA are present whether the disability is physical or
mental. In spite of this commonality, this Article concludes that not
only have people with mental disabilities fared no better than
20. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 99, 100 (1999); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621 (1999). See also Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth":
Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 6 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345 (1997) (taking
the position that the definition of a disability under the ADA is one of the most "contentious
aspects of disability law"); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection From
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997) (arguing that using the term substantially limited, the
courts have narrowly interpreted the definition of disability); Crossley, supra note 20, at 621
(addressing interpretation of the term disability in the ADA); Drimmer, supra note 8;
Eichhorn, supra note 8; Michelle Friedland, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life
Activity"Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171 (1999) (arguing that the ADA needs new
definitions for disability).
22. My primary focus in this Article is on mental illness and most of the arguments in
the Article are made in reference to mental illness, although they may also be applicable to
other types of mental disabilities, such as developmental delays. In Part III, infra, I discuss
the difficulty in defining mental illness. For now, I use one of the definitions used by the
American Psychiatric Association that "Mental illness is an illness that affects or is mani-
fested in a person's brain. It may impact on the way a person thinks, behaves, and interacts
with other people." What is Mental Illness, American Psychiatric Association, Public Informa-
tion, available at http://www.psych.org/public_info/what is mi.cfm (last visited Sept. 12,
2003). Mental illness is not one illness. It encompasses many different diseases. "Some of the
commonly known psychiatric disorders are depression; manic depression (also known as
bipolar disorder); anxiety disorders, including specific phobias (such as fear of heights),
social phobia, panic disorder, agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and generalized
anxiety disorder; schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, such as delusional disorder;
substance abuse and disorders related to substance abuse; delirium; dementia, including
Alzheimer's disease; eating disorders, such as bulimia and anorexia; sleep disorders; atten-
tion-deficit/hyperactivity disorder; learning disorders; sexual disorders; dissociative
disorders, such as multiple personality disorder; and personality disorders, such as border-
line personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder." Id.
[VOL. 36:3
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people with physical disabilities, but that they are, in fact, in an
even worse position.23 In addition, I posit that the ADA's failure to
provide adequate protection for people with mental disabilities is
caused by three congruent factors. First, there is a deeply
entrenched stigma attached to mental disabilities, including a
belief that there is a significant correlation between mental illness
and violent acts. Second, the ADA contains subtle distinctions
between physical and mental disabilities that further stigmatize
people with mental disabilities and may result in more
discrimination against them. Third, both the courts and the EEOC
have encountered great difficulty in eliminating their own
stereotypes about people with disabilities, in particular, the vision
of a disability as limited to an observable, physical one. Part I
briefly discusses the historical treatment of people with mental
illness. Part II examines the difficulty in defining mental illness.
Part III discusses the stigma and other problems faced by people
with mental illness today. This section also addresses employers'
difficulties in attempting to accommodate someone with a mental
illness. Part IV explores the distinction traditionally made between
physical and mental disabilities. In addition to documenting the
ramifications of this dividing line for people who are mentally
disabled, arguments for and against this dividing line are analyzed.
I conclude that the distinction between mental and physical
disabilities is no longer warranted (if it ever was) and explore the
role that this distinction continues to play in furthering the
problems faced by the people the ADA was designed to protect.
Finally, Part V proposes eliminating the ADA's distinctions between
mental and physical disability. While this would not eliminate all of
the problems faced by people with mental disabilities, it would
reduce the difficulties caused by the long held belief that mental
disabilities are somehow different, less real, and less worthy of
belief than physical ones.
23. While we may believe that the ADA has protected people with mental disabilities,
this is not the case. "There is, in short, a huge gap between what mental disability law ap-
pears to be, and what it actually is." Perlin, supra note 20, at 25.
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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Mental illness has been observed throughout the ages, 4 but be-
liefs about the causes and efficacious treatments of mental illness
have shifted over time.25 The first culture to differentiate between
mental and physical illness is lost in history, but we do know that
even the early Greeks and Romans made such a distinction.26
For most of our history, people with mental disabilities were
cared for by their families, 7 but this home care may well have been
less than idyllic.28 Refuting the vision of people with disabilities "be-
ing permitted to gambol on the village green," one historian
recounts evidence that people with mental disabilities were not
only abused, but were also frequently confined by the use of
chains.29 In the United States, "distracted persons," a term formerly
used to mean persons who were mentally ill, were often confined
to "strong-houses," which were, in actuality, tiny structures built for
one patient that were about five-by-seven foot in size. People with
mental illnesses were treated, if at all, with the traditional medical
treatment of their time, including bleeding, purging, and the giv-
ing of emetics.30
Hospitalization for persons with mental disorders began during
the eighteenth century and rapidly gained popularity. At New York
Hospital, the psychiatric building was designated "Lunatic Asylum"
and the first psychiatric hospital was founded "to make provision
24. FRANZ G. ALEXANDER, M.D. & SHELDON T. SELESNICK, M.S., THE HISTORY OF PSY-
CHIATRY: AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHIATRIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE FROM PREHISTORIC
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 3 (1966); MICHAEL H. STONE, HEALING THE MIND, A HISTORY OF
PSYCHIATRY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 3 (1997).
25. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SELESNICK, supra note 24, at 17-150.
26. GEORGE MORA, Early American Historians of Psychiatry: 1910-1960 in DISCOVERING
THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 55-67 (Mark S. Micale & Roy Porter eds., 1994) (tracing the
history of psychiatry to Greco-Roman culture); GEORGE ROSEN, MADNESS IN SOCIETY: CHAP-
TERS IN THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 71-83 (1968).
27. GERALD BROB, THE MAD AMONG Us, A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA'S MEN-
TALLY ILL 6 (1994); EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY, FROM THE ERA OF THE
ASYLUM TO THE AGE OF PROZAC 2 (1997); Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387, 389 (2000).
28. SHORTER, supra note 27, at 7. In England, persons with mental disabilities might be
at home or in a workhouse or poorhouse. The treatment of people with mental disabilities
was no better in this country. Some people with disabilities in this country were placed in
"little strong-houses for individual patients." Id.
29. Id. at 2. See also Kerr, supra note 27, at 390.
30. SHORTER, supra note 27, at 17.
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for the Support and Maintenance of Ideots [sic], Lunatics and
other Persons of Unsound Minds." 3'According to one scholar, the
history of psychiatry began in the custodial asylum, 2 which served
as a way for families to transfer the care and confinement of some-
one with a mental disability from their home and in their company,
to somewhere and someone else. 3 By the end of the eighteenth
century, however, people began to believe that institutionalization
would not only serve to segregate and warehouse people with men-
tal disabilities, it might also cure the person of a mental illness. 4
One doctor noted:
Madness is ... as manageable as many other distempers,
which are equally dreadful and obstinate, and yet are not
looked upon as incurable; such unhappy objects ought by no
means to be abandoned, much less shut up in loathsome
prisons as criminals or nuisances to the society.
35
In other words, the asylums of this era were supposed to cure pa-
tients, rather than to serve merely as an alternative to living with
and being cared for by their families. The cure came from a form
of "moral therapy," in which the patient was given some productive
activity, a good diet, and doctors tried to promote hope. According
to at least one historian, this is the beginning of formal, psycho-
36logical intervention.
Those who had what were considered to be "nervous disorders"
or allegedly less serious mental illnesses, were treated quite differ-
ently.3 7 Nervous disorders were treated by a traditional medical
doctor, although they have become the usual patients of modern
day psychologists and psychiatrists.3 Many people diagnosed with a
nervous disorder were apparently wealthy enough to seek treat-
ment at a "spa."3 9 One young woman was brought to a spa with
symptoms "that usually accompany the virgin disease., 40 These
symptoms included weakness in her wrists, facial discoloring, little
31. Id. (quoting Sven Torgersen, Genetic Factors in Anxiety Disorders, 40 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1085, 1085-1089 (1983)).
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id. at 10.
34. See SHORTER, supra note 27, at 24.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 22.
37. See SHORTER, supra, note 27, at 24.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. SHORTER, supra, note 27, at 24.
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appetite and "vapors and strange fits."41 She was allegedly cured by
seven weeks of bathing and drinking the waters. Her doctor be-
lieved that "giving her to a good husband" would prevent a
relapse.42
Physicians also distinguished between serious mental illnesses
and less serious ones.43 One doctor who treated patients outside
the spa setting wrote that nervous disorders were not the same as
madness but were more like physical illness." This became an
enormously popular belief.45 The person who was suffering from a
nervous disorder, as opposed to "madness," was not to blame for
having it. The main difference, however, between those who were
sent to the asylum as opposed to those treated in a spa or by a pri-
vate "nerve" doctor appears to have been wealth. 6 Those with the
economic means to do so could be treated outside the asylum, thus
effectively declaring that their problem was organic in nature. This
allowed those with enough money to avoid the stigma of hospitali-
zation for mental illness.4 v
The treatment of mental illness in this country has varied de-
pending on the current theory regarding causation. In the
eighteenth century, mental illness was thought to be caused by
something gone wrong in the body. 48 By the end of that century,
the current theory about the cause of mental illness was considered
a "matter of mind and spirit., 49 By the middle of the nineteenth
century, the theory had again changed and mental illness was reso-
lutely believed to be caused by a "brain disease."" Sigmund Freud
and the psychoanalytical movement ended the brain disease theory
and replaced it with psychoanalytical theory. 51 The brain disease
51theory, in a different format, is now again in force.
41. Id. at 24. See also Perlin, supra note 20, at 6 (describing difference in modern day
reactions to two people with mental illness, one poor and the other wealthy and famous).
42. SHORTER, supra note 27, at 24. For an interesting look at sexism in the history of
mental illness, see VIVIAN BURR, GENDER AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 7-8 (1998); Nancy
Tomes, Feminist Histories of Psychiatry, in DISCOVERING THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY, 348-350
(Mack S. Micale & Roy Porter eds. 1994).
43. SHORTER, supra note 27, at 24.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 24-26.
46. See Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 45.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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The historical treatment of mental illness also has a gendered
component. Note that the vast majority of people burned alive as
witches were women; the ratios vary from twenty to one to six to
one." More than one person has posited that those burned as
witches might actually have been suffering some form of mental
illness. Science replaced witchcraft as a dominant theme sometime
in the nineteenth century, and this had a significant effect on
women who were mentally ill; it gave new credibility to male scien-
tific and medical experts. Women were not only excluded from
these ranks,54 but were also over represented in the newly estab-
lished asylums of the nineteenth century." The population of
women in the asylums included those who were sexual noncon-
formists such as the "promiscuous," those who bore children out of
wedlock, and those who were sexually assaulted or raped and
traumatized by the event.
56
II. WHAT IS A MENTAL DISORDER?
A. Varying Definitions
The definition of a mental disorder or illness is elusive; it
depends in part on whom you ask and it is also contextual.57 "More
than race and gender, mental illness is a disputed concept with ill
defined boundaries. 5 8 Mental health can also be seen as a
53. JANE M. USSHER, WOMEN'S MADNESS: MISOGYNY OR MENTAL ILLNESS? 43 (1991).
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 71.
56. Id. at 73.
57.
It is all right to be 'out of contact' if you are a young woman who ignores suggestive
remarks from men as you walk along the street; it is all right (or at least it is no con-
cern of a psychiatrist) if you hear supernatural voices in the course of a Pentecostal
meeting; you may take off your clothes and dance at a hippie festival ofjoy and mu-
sic, you may hector and dominate in the classroom or parade ground, you may refuse
attention to onlookers if you are fishing, writing a PhD or meditating on StJohn of
the Cross: but if you try these things at home, in the wrong kind of public place or on
the observation ward of a mental institution, heaven help you because you are then
'mad,' 'mental' or eligible for some more technical diagnosis.
Id. at 135 (quoting Sedgewock, 1981:45). See also STONE, supra note 24, at 22; BONNIE &
MONAHAN, supra note 12, at 13-15. For a discussion of the effect of labeling someone as
mentally ill, see CAROL A. B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT, 46-48 (1982).
58. TOM CAMPBELL & CHRIS HEGINBOTHAM, MENTAL ILLNESS, PREJUDICE, DISCRIMI-
NATION AND THE LAW 20 (1991).
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continuum.5 9 The question of what constitutes a mental illness has
varied over time; in the not too distant past, both alcoholism and
homosexuality were considered to be mental illnesses but are no
longer considered as such. °
The DSM6' defines a mental disorder as:
[A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome
or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated
with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability
(i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of function-
ing) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death,
pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. In addition,
this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable
and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for
example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original
cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a
behavioral, psychological or biological dysfunction in the in-
dividual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual
and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or con-
flict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as
described above.
A somewhat more lay definition of mental illness is "a term used
for a group of disorders causing severe disturbances in thinking,
feeling and relating. They result in substantially diminished capac-
ity for coping with the ordinary demands of life." 63 The one
common trait of mental disorders is that they "all involve, or are
presumed to involve, some disturbance of mental functioning, be it
intellectual capacities, thought processes, emotions, or underlying
motivations."6 4 Mental illness has also been defined as a diagnos-
able mental disorder "characterized by abnormalities in cognition,
59. Sharon Begley, Is Everybody Crazy, Newsweek,Jan. 26, 1998, at 50.
60. CAMPBELL & HEGINBOTHAM, supra note 58, at 21.
61. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, xxi-xxii (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM].
62. Id. at xxi-xxii.
63. About Mental Illness, available at http://www.compeer.org/l/a9.asp (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003) (Compeer is a non-profit program that matches community volunteers in
supportive relationships with people who are receiving mental health treatment).
64. JOAN BUSFIELD, MEN, WOMEN, AND MADNESS, UNDERSTANDING GENDER AND MEN-
TAL DISORDER 52 (1996).
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emotion or mood, or the highest integrative aspects of behavior,
such as social interactions or planning of future activities."5
There are others, however, who would say that there is no such
thing as mental illness."" Thomas Szasz argued, controversially, that
the concept of mental illness is analogous to witchcraft. Just as ear-
lier societies were firmly convinced that witches existed, we are
firmly convinced that mental illness exists today. According to
Szasz, we will one day find out that mental illness was an ill-
conceived idea, just as was the idea of witchcraft. 7 Szasz posits that
in the past physicians had two choices-they could label a person
as ill or as a witch. Similarly, modern day physicians are similarly
68limited to two alternatives: organic illness or mental illness. In
support of this view of mental illness as a label for a disease that
does not exist, others have pointed out that "[i]llness is in part an
evaluative term defined by social convention and, more particu-
larly, 'mental illness' embodies evaluative assumptions about
acceptable social performance as well as the desirability of certain
types of experience." 6" Some have suggested that the idea of mental
illness has been manufactured in an attempt to control those who
break the rules of society.70 Others have a somewhat different view,
and argue that mental illness really involves "diverse kinds of rule
breaking for which society provides no explicit label and which,
therefore, sometimes lead to the labeling of the violator as men-
tally ill ....,,71
Labeling someone mentally ill also contains a gendered compo-
nent and the common wisdom is that women are over-represented
among mental health patients.72 Psychotropic drugs are prescribed
for women twice as often as for men, and women are more likely to
65. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, 39 (1999). Similarly, mental illness has been defined as "health
conditions characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some combina-
tion) associated with distress and/or impaired functioning." Facts & Figures About Mental
Illness, available at http://www.nami.org/fact.htm (The National Association of Mental Ill-
ness website).
66. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE INQUISITION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT xxiii (1970); BRANT
WENEGRAT, ILLNESS AND POWER 6 (1995) (explaining that some feminists argue that women
who challenge social order used to be called witches but today are diagnosed as mentally ill).
67. WENEGRAT, supra note 66, at xvi, 23.
68. Id. at 23.
69. CAMPBELL & HEGINBOTHAM, supra note 58, at 21.
70. JOEL T. BRASLOW, MENTAL ILLS AND BODILY CURES: PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1997).
71. WARREN, supra note 57, at 46.
72. BUSFIELD, supra note 64, at 2.
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have electro-convulsive shock therapy (ECT).7 Moreover, there is a
gendered pattern in the diagnosis of mental disorder. 4 For exam-
ple, 90% of cases of anorexia nervosa are female.75 Women are also
76more likely to be diagnosed with depression or anxiety than men.
But as one commentator points out, if the boundaries of mental
disorder were changed to include violent and criminal activity (in-
cluding child abuse), alcohol and drug abuse, the gendered
patterns of mental illness would change.77 Moreover, there is some
suggestion that problematic female behavior is viewed as mental
illness but problematic male behavior is viewed as wrongdoing.8 In
other words, diagnosing a person with a mental illness is subjec-
tive.79
The diagnosis of a physical illness often, although not always, in-
volves a determinative, objective assessment such as a blood test.
No analogous procedure is available for mental illness; diagnosis
rests on what the patient and others tell the doctor and what the
doctor observes.8 ° One writer has noted that "[a] n issue repeatedly
raised by feminists within psychology and other mental health
fields is the neglect of women's experiences in the knowledge gen-
erated about depression.""' Moreover, the majority of the time, the
people making the diagnosis of mental illness are "mostly male,
73. Id. at 3. Feminist studies have explored the way women are treated in the mental
health system, the sexual exploitation of women patients by male therapists, and the use of
psychotropic drugs to control female patients. Id. at 2-3.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id. at 15. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, hysteria was the most widely
diagnosed mental disorder among women.
76. The website of NAMI (National Association of Mental Illness) indicates clinical
depression affects twice as many women as men and then discusses biological, genetic, psy-
chological and social factors that may lead to this disparity. Women and Depression, available at
http://www.nami.org/helpline/women.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (NAMI is a non
profit a group that advocates on behalf of people with severe mental illness). See also RICH-
ARD A. LIPPA, GENDER, NATURE AND NURTURE 27 (2002); Anne Rhodes & Paula Goerings,
Gender Differences in the Use of Outpatient Mental Health Services, in WOMEN'S MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 21 (Bruce Lobotsky et. al eds., 1998); and Janet
M. Stoppard, Gender, Psychological Factors, and Depression, in DEPRESSION AND THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT: RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION WITH NEGLECTED POPULATIONS, 121 (Phil-
ippe Cappeliez & Robert I. Flynn eds., 1993).
77. BUSFIELD, supra note 64, at 101.
78. Others would call it clinical judgment. SeeJANET M. STOPPARD, UNDERSTANDING
DEPRESSION, FEMINIST SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACHES 9 (2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at5.
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mostly white, mostly wealthy, mostly American psychiatrists. '2 This
acts to exacerbate the subjectivity inherent in the diagnosis of a
mental illness.
Defining mental illness is fraught with difficulties including the
fact that it is heavily dependent on context. In addition to the diffi-
culty in defining mental illness, diagnosing mental illness is also
problematic, in large part, because of the subjectivity involved. Di-
agnosis of mental illness rests largely on what the patient reports
and a doctor observes. While it may be easy to recognize the pa-
tient's reporting as subjective, the doctor's observations may also
be subjective and skewed by various biases, including gender.
B. The ADA's Definitions and Its Interpretation
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of a disability.3 The ADA defines
"disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.84
Although the ADA does not define impairment, the regulations
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
provide that a mental or physical impairment is "[a] ny physiological
disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. S5 In addition, these
regulations provide that an impairment can also include "[a]ny
82. PAULA J. CAPLAN, THEY SAY YOU'RE CRAzY: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
PSYCHIATRISTS DECIDE WHO'S NORMAL 31 (1995).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Title II of the Act pertains to public services. Id.
§ 12131. Title III prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodations. Id. § 12182.
84. Id. § 12102(2). This definition was taken, without change, from the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 1384-85, (tracing the
history of this definition of disability); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded
As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997) (discussing the
interpretation of this provision).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2000).
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mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities",.6
Having an impairment within the meaning of the ADA does not
mean that the person is disabled; the impairment must also sub-
stantially limit a major life activity.8 7 "Substantially limits" means
unable to perform a major life activity that an average person can
perform, or that a person is significantly restricted in their ability
to perform a major life activity. 8 Major life activities, which are not
defined in the ADA but rather in the regulations promulgated by
EEOC, include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. '' 9
This list is not exclusive; reproduction, for example, which is not
on the list, can be a major life activity.9° EEOC's Interpretive Guid-
ance acknowledges that the list is not exhaustive and includes
other activities such as "sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching."9'
With the exception of learning, and possibly working, all of the
activities on this list are far more apparent as physical activities
than mental ones.92 Noticeably absent are activities that are typi-
cally associated with mental illness, such as the ability to get along
with others, the ability to have appropriate emotive reactions, or to
have ordered cognitive functioning.9 It is not until one reaches
EEOC's Enforcement Guidelines94 that some of these activities are
even mentioned. Thus, the Regulation's list of major life activities
reveals the supposition that the activities that are truly major in
86. Id. § 1630.2(h) (2).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A)
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1)-(2).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
90. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that patient with asymptomatic
HIV was disabled because the ability to reproduce and bear children was a major life activity
within the meaning of the ADA).
91. ADA Title I EEOC Interpretive Guidance § 1630.2(i). Note that the Interpretive
Guidance is not the same as the Regulations Implementing Title I of the ADA.
92. Learning might be associated more with developmental delays and some brain in-
juries but not necessarily with mental illness. Working presents unique problems and it is
unclear if this will be upheld as a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S.
471, 477 (2001) (assuming, without deciding, that working is a major life activity).
93. Richard E. Gardner III, Mind Over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity
Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 682 (2002).
94. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiat-
ric Disabilities 4 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov.docs/psych.html (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Note that courts do not afford the same
degree of deference to Enforcement Guidelines that they do to Interpretive Regulations.
See, e.g., General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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one's life are physical as opposed to mental. Moreover, it suggests
that Congress, in enacting the ADA, and the EEOC, in enforcing
Title I of the ADA, envisioned the disability paradigm as a physical
one. Because of this emphasis on the major life activities that are
affected by a physical disability, it is not surprising that courts have
struggled with the question of what constitutes a major life activity
with regard to mental illness. For example, some courts have re-
fused to find that the ability to concentrate is a major life activity. 5
One plaintiff, diagnosed with major depression," argued that her
illness affected her ability to concentrate, a decidedly mental func-
tion, and that the ability to concentrate was a major life activity.
Although not disputing the diagnosis of mental illness, the court
rejected the idea that the ability to concentrate was, by itself, a ma-
jor life activity.97 Thus, the plaintiff could not establish that she was
disabled.
The ADA defines a disability, in part, as a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.
The ADA does not go further and define either "substantially lim-
its" or "major life activities." While various EEOC regulations do
attempt to define these terms, the definitions themselves reveal
that the focus of this agency is more on physical illnesses than
mental ones.
C. Problems Faced by People with Disabilities Under the ADA
1. Discrimination Against People with a Mental Illness-
Discrimination against someone with a mental disability is, in some
ways, just like discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or physi-
cal disability. Discrimination on the basis of a mental disability,
however, has unique aspects. In race or gender discrimination,
someone is discriminated against because of membership in a
95. Pacle v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811
(1999) (holding that concentration is not a major life activity under the ADA). See also Hook
v. Georgia-Gulf Corp., 788 So. 2d. 47, 55 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to accept concentra-
tion as a major life activity); Lemire v. Silva, 104 F. Supp. 2d. 80, 87 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding
that the ability to concentrate is not a major life activity); Philips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78
F. Supp. 2d. 1274, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that concentration is not a major life activ-
ity); Henderson v. New York Life, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 527, 537 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(concentration is not a major life activity recognized under the ADA).
96. Pacle, 166 E3d at 1300.
97. Id. at 1305.
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protected class. An employer may refuse to hire all African-
Americans because they are identified as African-American, or all
women because they are women. Discrimination on the basis of a
physical disability is different; someone is discriminated against
because they have a particular physical disability and not necessar-
ily because of their membership in a group of people labeled
"disabled." Those who wear the designation of physically disabled
are a very diverse group; an employer may discriminate within that
group by refusing to hire someone with AIDS or cancer but hiring
someone with diabetes or who is deaf. Although people who are
labeled as mentally disabled are also a very diverse group, dis-
crimination on the basis of a mental disability may operate more
like discrimination on the basis of race or gender-it may be
membership-based because it fails to make nuanced distinctions
among the class members. For example, an employer that would
not hire someone who is diagnosed with bipolar disorder might be
just as likely to refuse to hire someone with a different diagnosis of
mental illness.99 Thus, people who are mentally ill are subject to the
same stereotypes regardless of the degree of severity of their ill-
ness,'0 its manageability, its behavioral consequences, or particular
diagnosis. Accordingly, once an employer believes that an em-
ployee or applicant has a mental illness, the exact nature of that
illness may well be irrelevant. 0 ' The failure to differentiate between
different types of mental illness may be due to the strength of our
reactions to people with mental impairments. In other words, just
as in race or gender discrimination, once someone is seen as a
member of the group labeled "mentally ill" they are subject to
stereotypes and other responses that lead to employment discrimi-
• 102
nation.
98. They may also be discriminated against based on their perceived membership in a
protected class.
99. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979), the Court recognized the difficulty
for even psychiatrists differentiate behaviors and to render a diagnosis with certainty. See also
Eve M. Brank, et al., Parental Compliance: Its Role In Termination of Parental Rights Cases, 80
NEB. L. Rav. 335, 345 (2001) (noting that the Nebraska statute at issue failed to differentiate
between mental retardation and mental illness and thus lumping the two different catego-
ries into one); Stefan, supra note 9, at 273-74 (noting that the degree of discomfort people
feel upon learning that someone is mentally ill is not dependent on the severity of that per-
son's symptoms).
100. Stefan, supra note 9, at 273-74.
101. APA Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
102. Note that this is different from how we treat persons with physical disabilities.
Some physical disabilities affect us differently than others; we may be more uncomfortable
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There may also be some difference in how we treat someone
with a mental illness, such as obsessive compulsive disorder
("OCD") as opposed to a mental condition, such as mental retar-
dation or a physical condition, such as deafness. Although the
ADA's definition of a disability encompasses both physical and
mental diseases, such as OCD and cancer and mental or physical
conditions such as mental retardation or deafness, diseases and
conditions elicit quite different responses.1 3 While both diseases
and conditions may be disabling, they are not the same. Our soci-
ety views both disease and conditions as something that should be
cured. 1 4 Some people 0 ' who are labeled "disabled," do not want to
be "cured" because they believe there is nothing wrong with
them. I° A person who is Deaf may be viewed as disabled, but may
need no medical treatment: he or she is not ill. A person with dis-
ease, such as skin cancer, may, in fact, require medical
intervention, and may or may not be disabled.
10 7
People who have a mental illness may also be different from
people with other kinds of illness because they may reject their la-
bel entirely. While a Deaf person may not think of deafness as a
disability, he or she would accept the label of non-hearing. A per-
son with a mental illness, however, may entirely reject the
concept/label of mental illness.00
People with a mental illness who accept the label of disability
may still feel separate from those with a physical disability. Some
advocates of rights for people with mental disabilities suggest that
they join forces with the physically disabled as proponents of rights
for all kinds of disabilities.'0 9 This suggestion is based on a view that
disability is largely socially constructed."0 But some people with
mental disorders do not want to be a part of this model because
they perceive that the disability rights movement has traditionally
around someone with a profound visual impairment than we are around someone in a
wheelchair.
103. Eichhorn, supra note 8, at 1411.
104. BICKENBACH, supra note 7, at 64-65 (discussing the medicalization of disability).
105. People who are deaf may not want to have their hearing "corrected." See PAUL C.
HIGGINS, MAKING DISABILITY: EXPLORING THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN VARIA-
TION, 237-238 (1992).
106. Eichhorn, supra note 8, at 1411.
107. ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 77 (1998).
108. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 48.
109. WILLIE V. BRYAN, IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM: How PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES HAVE
BEEN DISENFRANCHISED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 30 (1996).
110. Id.; BICKENBACH, supra note 7, at 135-137; HIGGINS, supra note 105, at 25.
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excluded people with mental illness. " ' Accordingly, some people
with a mental illness feel that they are discriminated against even
within the disability community."
2
Discrimination against people with disabilities takes many forms.
Discrimination in the workplace could be a refusal to hire or a
termination. Discrimination on the basis of a mental illness, how-
ever, has some unique aspects and can include violence against
someone with a mental disability." 3 It can also have quite subtle
effects such as silencing people with mental illness who may refuse
to talk about their illness.' 4 It can also lead to fear that the people
in the workplace "won't go to lunch with you, won't socialize with
you, won't want to work alongside of you. " '
In many ways, discrimination on the basis of a mental illness is
much like any other kind of discrimination. It may, however, be
more subject to stereotypes about members of the class of persons
with a mental illness than those with a physical illness. Discrimina-
tion against someone with a physical disability may well be based
on the particular kind of physical disability. Discrimination on the
basis of a mental illness, however, may be more group based; if you
are mentally ill, the exact nature of your illness may be unimpor-
tant because you are clustered with everyone else labeled mentally
ill.
2. Problems Under the ADA-While some problems encountered
under the ADA are unique to people with a mental disability, they
also face many of the same problems as people with a physical
disability. In numerous disability cases, both mental and physical,
employers argued that the condition was not a disability."6 When
employers are successful in convincing the court that the plaintiff
is not a member of the protected class, the case is dismissed."7
Proving membership in the protected class rarely has been a
111. See BRYAN, supra note 109, at30.
112. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 133.
113. Violence Against Mentally Disabled Poses Dilemma for Families, CNN.coM, Dec. 18, 2000,
at http://www.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/12/18/disabled.victims.ap/index.html (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
114. See, e.g., Charlotte Huff, Secret suffering-Fear of stigma can prevent disclosure of illness,
FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 11, 2000 (quoting Peggy Mastroianni, legal counsel,
E.E.O.C.).
115. Id.
116. Crossley, supra note 20, at 623 (noting that this issue is frequently litigated). See also
Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 352 (1997) (noting that the defini-
tion of disability is one of the "most contentious aspects of disability law").
117. Crossley, supra note 20, at 621.
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significant issue in cases of race or sex discrimination brought
under Title VII," but it is the major issue in disability
discrimination cases."9 The question whether someone is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA has proven to be a major
stumbling block for plaintiffs and the vast majority lose on this
ground.2  The courts' unwillingness or inability to give a broad
reading to the term disability is well documented. 2' Many
commentators have written criticizing this aspect of the ADA and
its interpretation in the courts. 22 Their suggestions would go far in
alleviating the problems encountered in enforcing the ADA,
regardless of the type of disability and will not be discussed in
detail here. These suggestions would not, however, eliminate the
second-class status of mental disabilities in comparison to physical
ones.
The courts' reluctance to find that the plaintiff's impairment
constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA necessarily
focuses on whether that impairment "substantially limits a major
life activity." The courts' hesitation to find that a plaintiff is
disabled is due, at least in part, to stereotypes about disability in
general and mental illness in particular. In Breiland v. Advance
Circuits, Inc., for example, the court considered whether the
ability to get along with others was a major life activity. The
plaintiff, diagnosed with major depression and schizoid personality
disorder, 24 was disciplined for yelling, in anger, at a co-worker,
putting garbage on a table in the lunchroom, using profanity
118. See, e.g.,Jane ByeffKorn, Cancer and the ADA, Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
399, 414 (2001); Kevin W. Williams, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Ap-
plying the Burden Shifting Framework Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to
Claims Brought under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
98, 131 (1997).
119. Colker, supra note 20, at 99-100; Crossley, supra note 20, at 621; Williams, supra
note 118, at 131.
120. Colker, supra note 20, at 99-100; Korn, supra note 118, at 416; S. Elizabeth Wilborn
Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L.
REv. 603, 605 (2001).
121. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstros, Subordination, Stigma & "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv. 397
(2000); Korn, supra note 118.
122. See, e.g., Michelle Friedland, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life Activity"
Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REv. 171 (1999); Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barri-
ers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 907, 910 (1997);
Susan M. Gibson, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Individuals with a History of
Cancer from Employment Discrimination: Myth or Reality, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167
(1998).
123. 976 F. Supp. 858 (D. Minn. 1997). But see McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967 (10th
Cir. 2001) (giving broad interpretation to ADA in case involving mental illness).
124. 976 F. Supp. at 860.
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during a confrontation with a supervisor, angry reactions to a
supervisor, and excessive use of profanity. The plaintiff was
suspended for an "incident of uncontrolled anger and for violation
of the offensive behavior policy."25 The plaintiff alleged that he was
discriminated against because of his mental illness which he
argued substantially limited him in the major life activity of getting
along with others. The court observed that getting along with
others was different from the other kinds of major life activities
that were listed in the regulations. 126 Holding, therefore, that the
ability to get along with others was not a major life activity, the
court noted its subjective and contextual nature and found that it
was "not the sort of activity within" the purview of the ADA.
2
1
The emphasis on physical disability, as opposed to mental, is also
evidenced in the legislative history. Courts, turning to legislative
history in order to discern the meaning of the term "disability,"
have noted that while it is replete with evidence of discrimination
on the basis of physical disability, there are very few references to
discrimination on the basis of a mental disability.1 28 Accordingly,
while the problems encountered by people with a mental illness
are sometimes similar to those faced by people with a physical dis-
ability, the ADA poses some unique issues for people with a mental
disability. Some of these distinctive issues arise from the focus, by
Congress and the EEOC, on the prototype of physical disability.
125. Id. at 861.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 862.
128. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes
Be Undone, 8J.L. & HEALTH 15, 25 (1993/1994) (finding two references); Carolee Kvoriak
Lezuch, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Redefining "Major Life Activity" o Protect the
Mentally Disabled, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1839, 1843-33 (1999) (finding no mention of discrimi-
nation on the basis of mental illness). One commentator has suggested, however, that the
direct threat defense was put into the ADA as a defense against hiring people with mental
disabilities, and serves to reinforce the stereotype that people with mental disabilities are
more likely to pose a threat.
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III. STIGMA AND STEREOTYPES
A. The Stigma of Mental Illness
People with all types of disabilities are stigmatized.'' We use the
stigma of disability as a way of separating ourselves from people
with disabilities1 30 and mental illness is no exception.1 3 1 People with
disabilities are seen with pity and fear,1 3 ' and as inferior, needy, and
dependent.13 While some people who are seen as having overcome
a disability may be admired or even viewed as inspirational, 34 dis-
abilities usually make people uncomfortable.
Stereotypes about people with mental disabilities include that
they are "erratic, deviant, morally weak, unattractive, sexually un-
controllable, emotionally unstable, lazy, superstitious, [and]
ignorant."3 ' Many believe that if mentally ill people would only tryWel1 36
harder, they would get well. In this view, mental illness is due to
internal weakness or other personal shortcomings.
Alternatively, some view mental illness as virtually untreatable.
Mental illness is also seen, by some, as a myth, less real than a
physical disorder.' In part, this is because we do not believe what
we cannot see. Unlike some physical disabilities, mental illness is
not readily observable. When we think of a disability, we usually
think of someone who is in a wheelchair or who is blind. We can
readily see the assistive devices that some people use, such as a
wheelchair or a seeing-eye dog, and those assistive devices have
129. BICKENBACH, supra note 7, at 143; Diller, supra note 6, at 1003; Adrienne L. Hiegel,
Note, Sexual Exclusions; The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1451 (1994).
130. Korn, supra note 118, at 417.
131. See Patrick W. Corrigan et al., PrNjudice, Social Distance, and Familiarity with Mental
Illness, 27 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 219 (2001); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on
the Borderline". Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them", 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
775, 787 (1998).
132. Diller, supra note 6, at 1003.
133. BICKENBACH, supra note 7.
134. Simi LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY, KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY, 17-18 (1990)
(arguing that disabilities are not overcome but rather that a person with a disability can only
overcome the stigma of being disabled).
135. Perlin, supra note 131, at 785.
136. Id. at 787.
137. Mental illness is, however, treatable. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association,
Mental Illness (An Overview), available at http://www.psych.org/publicjinfo/overview.cfm
(last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
138. Fred Osher, Mental Illness and Violence, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 24, 2000, at 13A. See
also Tom Siegfried & Sue Goetinck, Mental Illness is No Myth (1996), available at http://
www.pendulum.org/articles/articles-dmn-nomyth.html (last modified Dec. 25, 2002).
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become almost synonymous with disability. But many disabilities,
both physical and mental, are "invisible." People with a mental
illness do not have assistive devices or readily observable
manifestations and, accordingly, just do not fit the traditional
image of a person with a disability.
People with mental disabilities may be treated as infants, or al-
ternatively, as demons. 39 Many are embarrassed by people with
mental illness.140 People who are mentally disabled are also be-
lieved to be incapable of being good parents and thus, should not
reproduce. 4' The stigma of being diagnosed with a mental illness
may cause some to forgo treatment, rather than incur the many
disadvantages of being labeled "mentally ill.'
42
While every society seems to have its scapegoats, people with
mental illness are disproportionately placed in this role. 143 People
with mental disabilities today may well be "'the most despised and
feared group in our society.'"'4 Part of this fear is the same fear
that is commonly felt about physical disability-the able-bodied
139. Perlin, supra note 131, at 787.
140. CAMPBELL & HEGINBOTHAM, supra note 58, at 20.
141. Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the
Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387,
387 (2000). This may be particularly true in some minority cultures. Erica Goode, Disparities
Seen in Mental Care for Minorities, New York Times, August 27, 2001, at Al. See also Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (finding sterilization of mentally disabled was constitutional). Stephen
Jay Gould, however, has argued that Carrie Buck was not mentally disabled but rather, was
institutionalized as a way to hide a pregnancy. SeeStephenJay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2
CoNsT. COMMENT. 331, 336-37 (1985). See also Roberta M. Berry, From Involuntary Steriliza-
tion to Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell, 12 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'y 401 (1998).
142. CAMPBELL & HEGINBOTHAM, supra note 58, at 23; Maria A. Morrison, Changing Per-
ceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D.
L. REv. 8, 8-9 (2000); Hope Yen, Stigma Remains Barrier for Mentally Ill, Advocates Say, PITT.
POST-GAZETrE, Mar. 7, 2000, at B8. A person with a physical illness is more likely to seek
treatment than someone who has a psychiatric condition. The National Women's Health
Information Center, Women with Disabilities: Psychiatric Disabilities, available at http://
www.4women.gov.wwd/psychiatric.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2002) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Moreover, it is possible that the stigma of mental
illness has kept us from providing treatment. Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities:
The Different Treatment of Mental versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans,
50 BAYLOR L. Rv. 361, 361 (1998). It should also be noted that only a small percentage of
people with mental illness actually get adequate care and minorities are much less likely
than whites to get adequate care. Few With Mental Illness Get Adequate Care-US Study, May 10,
2002, available at http://www.contac.org/contaclibrary/research62.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2003).
143. For example, one explanation of the witch trials is that they involved men and
women who were undiagnosed as mentally ill. See USSHER, supra note 53, at 55.
144. Perlin, supra note 17, at 82.
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fear that one day they may be physically disabled.145 Similarly, peo-
ple may be afraid that they, one day, may become mentally
disabled.
People also fear those with mental illness because they associate
mental illness with violence.16 The label mentally ill conjures up
images of people who are not competent or safe to be around.'47
The term mentally ill is equated with crazy, meaning out of control
and out of touch with reality. The stigma of mental illness may of-
ten be harder for patients than the mental illness itself.
4 8
People who are mentally ill and in the workplace fare no better.
Employers fear workplace violence and resulting liability.4 9 While
violence in the workplace is a problem, it is not caused primarily by
people with mental disorders; workplace homicides are principally
caused by robbery and are not usually the result of mental illness. 50
The prejudice against people with mental illness has been called
sanism and this prejudice is comparable to racism and sexism." '
Sanism is pervasive, and it is perpetuated by judges,12 by doctors,
and by social workers. 5 3 Sanism is evident in our language. As one
mental health activist explained, "We're not language police. We
don't expect the word crazy to disappear. But we're hoping for the
day when these stereotypes are as unacceptable as racist and sexist
remarks." 54 Oddly, sanism may lessen if mental illness is coupled
with a physical one. A recent study has indicated that persons with
145. Eichhorn, supra note 8, at 1415.
146. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 20, at 666.
147. CAPLAN, supra note 82, at 11.
148. James Willwerth, It Hurts Like Crazy. (Offensive Portrayals of the Mentally Ill), TIME,
Feb. 15, 1993, at 53 available at 1993 WL 2931775. This stigma may cause people with a men-
tal illness to fail to seek treatment. A 1999 study done by the Surgeon General of the United
States indicates that nearly half of all people in the country with a severe mental illness fail
to seek treatment. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, "Scientific Revo-
lution" in Mental Health Research and Services Declared in First Surgeon General's Report
on Mental Health, available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/events/prsurgeon.cfm (last modi-
fied Oct. 4, 2000).
149. Karen Dill Danforth, Reading Reasonableness out of the ADA: Responding to Threats by
Employees with Mental Illness Following Palmer, 85 Va. L. Rev. 661, 684 (1999). See also McKenzie
v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving plaintiff, with 10 years of experience as a
sheriff, who was not hired by any law enforcement agency following treatment for mental
illness based, at least in part, on concerns about liability).
150. Danforth, supra note 149, at 684. In fact, persons with mental disabilities may be
the target of acts of violence. Supra note 113.
151. Perlin, supra note 131, at 791.
152. See alsoPerlin, supra note 20, at 12.
153. Kerr, supra note 27, at 393 (arguing that social workers, along with lawyers, judges
and psychologists believe that people with mental disabilities are unable to be adequate
parents).
154. Willwerth, supra note 148 (quoting remarks ofJean Arnold).
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both a mental disability and a physical one do better in the em-
ployment arena than those with a mental disability alone. 55 Experts
postulate that this may be because the presence of the physical dis-
ability reduces the stigma of having a mental illness.'59 After all, if
you have cancer, people can understand why you have anxiety or
depression. If, however, your life looks good to others, depression
or anxiety is not so understandable.
The stigma of mental illness pervades our culture and is per-
petuated in the media.' 57 More than half of Americans believe that
persons with mental illness are more likely to commit acts of vio-
lence than those who are not mentally ill."15 When a crime is
committed, newspaper articles frequently cite that the alleged
criminal has a history of mental illness. 59 Studies of movies and
television programs reveal that "the image of people with mental
illness as psychotic killers and 'evil people' has become deeply em-bedded in our popular culture.' 60 The vast majority of portrayals
of persons who are mentally ill are as violent and dangerous.16' One
study tracked the portrayals of people with mental illness on televi-
sion in prime time and found that more than 72% of the television
characters were portrayed as violent. 
62
To make the problem even more intractable, stereotypes about
people with mental illness are contradictory. On the one hand, one
common view is that mental illness is a predictor of violence. On
the other hand, a different, but also common belief, is that mental
illness is made up, and that if the person were only stronger or bet-
ter, the mental illness would be eliminated.163 In fact, the majority
155. BONNIE & MONAHAN, supra note 12, at 35.
156. Id. (proposing other possible explanations).
157. Douglas Biklen, The Culture of Policy: Disability Images and Their Analogues in Public
Policy, 15 POL'Y STUD.J. 515 (1987).
158. APA Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
159. See generally supra note 2.
160. Ken Parish Perkins, Screen Stigma: Television Depicts Mentally Ill as Drug-Abusing, Law-
Breaking Psychos, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2000, at 9.
161. Id. See also Aaron Barnhart, Malice in Wonderland', KAN. CITY STAR, April 5, 2000,
at Fl; Steven E. Hyler et al., Homicidal Maniacs and Narcissistic Parasites: Stigmatization of Men-
tally Ill Persons in the Movies, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1044 (Oct. 1991).
162. Willwerth, supra note 148, at 53.
163. National Mental Health Association, Did You Know? NMIHA Statistics, available at
http://www.nmha.org/infoctr/didyou.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (citing statistic that
in a recent survey, 71% of the people polled believed that mental illness is caused by emo-
tional weakness and that 43% believed that mental illness is brought on by the individual).
See also Susan Brink, For Severe Mental Illness, A Higher Profile and New Hope, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 20, 1999, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/991220/
nycu/mental.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting
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of people believe that mental illness is caused by emotional weak-
ness or bad parenting." 4 Many also believe that mental illness is
caused by immoral behavior or is otherwise brought on in someway
by the individual.'f 5
Because the stigma associated with being diagnosed with a men-
tal illness is so severe, it may inhibit people from getting treatment.
The stereotypes about mental illness reveal that very little is actu-
ally known about mental illness. While physical disabilities may
make others uncomfortable, mental disabilities often instill fear. It
is this fear factor that differentiates the stigma associated with men-
tal disabilities from that of physical disabilities.
B. The Stereotype of Violence
People who are mentally ill are feared primarily because others
assume that they are violent or will become violent.'66 This fear is
prevalent in the workplace, and may cause much of the employ-
ment discrimination against people with mental illness.'67 Although
the common perception is that there is a correlation between men-
tal disorder and violence,16  the question whether such a
relationship actually exists is a difficult one to answer.16 9 Most of the
that one message of the new issued report by the Surgeon General is that mental illness is as
real as heart disease). In fact, one form of mental illness, depression, is now second only to
heart disease as the most disabling illness suffered by employees. Australasian Business Intel-
ligence: The Mercury (Dec. 18, 2000) (citing an international labor organization survey).
164. Even judges have these stereotypes. See Perlin, supra note 152, at 14-16.
165. National Mental Health Association, supra note 163.
166. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness; Labels, Causes, Dangerousness,
and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. OF PuB. HEALTH 1328 (1999). The perception that people with
mental illness are violent affects not only our laws about mental illness but also our informal
interactions. This fear of violence has been noted since before the Christian era. John
Monahan, Major Mental Disorders and Violence to Others, in HANDBOOK OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAV-
IOR 92 (David M. Stoff et al. eds., 1997).
167. John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence
Risk, 176 BRIT.J. PSYCHIATRY 312 (2000).
168. The stereotypical image of people with mental illness that is portrayed by the me-
dia may be a major factor. Monahan, supra note 166, at 92.
169. See, e.g., Jeffrey w. Swanson, Mental Disorder Substance Abuse and Community Violence:
An Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER, DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 101, 131-132 (John Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman eds., 1994) ("On the one
hand, we now have some hard numbers to back up the notion that persons with serious and
persistent mental illness are on average more violent than the rest of the population.... On
the other hand, we now have compelling evidence that the mentally ill, as a group, do not
pose a high risk in absolute terms. Only about 7% of all those with major mental disorder
(but without substance abuse) engage in any assaultive behavior in a given year.").
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recent studies suggest that while a correlation may exist, it is quite
small and/or weak.
1. Violence in the Workplace--Some people assert that there has
been an increase in violence in the workplace and blame, in part,
the ADA.Y° Underlying this position is the assumption that people
with mental illness are the ones that cause violence in the work-
place, 71 that violence is predictable, 172 and that compliance with
the ADA makes it impossible to screen out people who are likely to
become violent.7 3 All three assumptions are incorrect.
Those who point out that violence in the workplace is increasing
frequently cite to statistics that show that violence is the leading
cause of death for women in the workplace and the second leading
cause of death for men.1 74 Another statistic used to support the
170. See Vicki A. Laden & Gregory Schwartz, Psychiatric Disabilities, the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act the New Workplace Violence Account, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 246, 270 (2000)
("The new workplace violence account... posits that worker-on-worker violence is a serious
problem and suggests that potentially violent workers can be identified and removed from
the workplace before disaster descends. Furthermore, it portrays the ADA as an unfortunate
obstacle around which a prudent employer must navigate to protect employees.").
171. SeeJennifer J. Hamilton & Anne N. Walker, Negligent Hiring and Retention: Walking
the ADA Tightrope Between Being Too Careful and Not Careful Enough, 7 No.5 CONN. EMp'. L. LET-
TER 2 (1999) (finding an "undeniable correlation between acts of workplace violence and
certain types of mental illness"); Laden & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 251 (describing an
individual who among other things, overreacts to perceived injustice, has few friends or
apparent interests and seems strange, meeting media stereotype of individual who is likely to
"go postal").
172. Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace and the Myth of the "Dangerously Mentally Ill",
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 849, 852-53 (2001) (discussing current belief that risk of violence is
tied to mental illness, but concluding that connections is based on many factors, including
age, gender, socioeconomic status and "the presence ... of hostile or threatening relation-
ships"). But see Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation that Drives Us Crazy: An Overview of
"Mental Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 108 n.198
(2001) (citing Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally Disordered
Offenders, 3 PSYCHOL. POL'Y & L. 131, 133 (1997) (reporting upon a study that suggested
that predictions of future violence by psychiatrists and psychologists were wrong for two out
of three patients)).
173. See Danforth, supra note 149, at 694. ("[R]eading the duty of reasonable accom-
modation out of the ADA for disabled employees who make threats in the workplace serves
to promote the very stereotypes the Act was implemented to overcome."); Georgia A. Staton
& GregJ. Thompson, A Practical Perspective on Employee Violence and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 35 ARIz. Aarr'Y 32, 32 (1999) (suggesting screening of applicants may protect
employers against workplace violence liability but stating that such screening may violate the
ADA). But cf. Hubbard, supra note 172, at 852-53.
174. See, e.g., Ann Hayes, Workplace Violence: Prediction and Prevention, 20 PACE L. REv. 297,
298 (2000); Louis A. Karasik & Nicole Rivas, Workplace Violence, NAT'L L.J., April 24, 2000, at
B7. There are at least three reasons why women are killed more often then men: 1) women
are frequently the first visible employee 2) women are frequently employed in personnel
and human resources and 3) domestic violence spills over into the workplace. Karasik supra.
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claim that violence in the workplace is escalating is the fact that
there are more than one thousand homicides in the workplace
each year,'75 more than two million people become victims of vio-
lence in the workplace each year,'7" 18,000 people are assaulted at
work each week,' 77 and sixty-one people are injured by acts of vio-
lence in the workplace each day.178 About 20 percent of these
violent attacks involve offenders who are armed. 79 The costs of
these physical attacks for employers are enormous; one estimate is
$4.2 billion.' s Some have predicted that as the economy takes a
downturn and layoffs increase, acts of violence will increase. 8'
Other experts, however, dispute that there is an increase in
workplace violence.12 According to these experts, the "one thou-
sand homicides each year" include the deaths of retail store clerks
and taxi cab drivers that are killed during armed robberies com-
mitted by intruders and customers. Retail employees are the most
likely to be murdered while at work.83 While we hear a lot about
disgruntled employees returning to the workplace armed, in fact,
only 7% of workplace homicides are committed by current or for-
mer employees.' 4 At least two major employers have discovered
that workplace homicides can be greatly reduced by preventing
robberies.'8 5 Accordingly, "the problem of workplace violence de-
rives overwhelmingly from companies failing to protect workers
from outsider crime."8 6 Regardless of the actual statistics, however,
175. K. Tia Burke, Violence in the Workplace: Why Employers Are Caught In The Middle, 21 PA.
LAw. 18,18 (1999). From 1990-1994, homicide was the leading cause of on-the-job deaths in
California, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and New York. Michael Wiesenfeld, Death of a
Salesman: A True Story About OSHA Recommendations And Workplace Homicide, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 133, 134 (2000).
176. Burke, supra note 175, at 18.
177. Kimberly Gee Stith, Violence in the Workplace: The Armed and Angry Employee, 29 Brief
8 (Fall, 1999) (citing 1997 statistics from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health).
178. Kristine Hayes, Prepostal Prevention of Workplace Violence: Establishing an Ombuds Pro-
gram as One Possible Solution, 14 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. REsOL. 215,216 (1998).
179. Gregory M. Posner-Weber, Book Review, 72 Wis. LAw. 50 (May, 1999).
180. Georgia A. Staton & Greg J. Thompson, A Practical Perspective on Employee Violence
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 ARIZ. Ar'y 32 (Apr., 1999).
181. Mike France, The Workplace: Violence, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 12, 2001, at 98.
182. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 270.
183. Wiesenfeld, supra note 175, at 133. (noting that "75% of workplace murders occur
during robberies, compared to nine percent of murders being robbery-related in the gen-
eral population").
184. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 256.
185. Id. at 257 (citing the experience of Southland Corporation and Roy Rogers restau-
rants).
186. Id. at 259.
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most people believe that an employee with a mental illness is dan-
187
gerous.
2. Violence and Mental Illness-While some studies have shown
that people with mental illness are no more violent than the gen-
eral population,88 other studies indicate that although there is a
correlation between violence and mental illness,Is° it is limited.'l 0
Suffice it to say, not all people who are mentally ill will commit acts
of violence.' Moreover, recent studies indicate that about 90% of
• 192
those diagnosed as mentally ill are not violent.
Compared to the magnitude of risk associated with the com-
bination of male gender, young age, and lower socioeconomic
status for example, the risk of violence presented by mental
disorder is modest. Compared to the magnitude of risk asso-
ciated with alcoholism and other drug abuse, the risk
associated with 'major' mental disorders such as schizophre-
nia and affective disorder is modest indeed. Clearly, mental
illness status makes at best a trivial contribution to the overall
level of violence in society. 93
Despite these facts, people associate mental illness with violence
and this perception is increasing.
194
While mental illness is one factor that may help predict violent
behavior, it is only one of many. For example, anger may be a fac-
187. Id. See also William Atkinson, Workplace Violence, 2 GLOBAL ENERGY Bus. 48 (Aug. 1,
2000) (noting that "many perpetrators are mentally ill and may be predisposed to violence
as a result of their illness"). In fact, however, studies indicate that it is family members, not
co-workers, who are most at risk of an act of violence by someone with a mental illness. APA
Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
188. See, e.g., Astrid James, Foreword to LANCET, Sept. 26, 1998; Alison Bass, Stigma
Against Mental Illness Persists Despite New Research, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 16, 1992, at A3.
189. Monahan, supra note 166, at 97.
190. Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal Behavior of
Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 137, 156-157 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds.,
1994); SAYCE, supra note 5, at 33; Edward P. Mulvey &Jess Fardella, Are The Mentally Ill Really
Violent?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 39, available at 2000 WL 10789899.
191. Mulvey& Fardella, supra note 190, at 39.
192. Monahan, supra note 166, at 97.
193. Id.
194. Fred Osher, Mental Illness and Violence, BALT. SUN, March 24, 2000, at 13A (finding
that while 13 percent of the public associated violence with mental illness in the 1950s, that
figure has increased to 31 percent in the 1990s, at the same time that the "amount of vio-
lence attributable to persons with mental disorders decreased").
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tor predictive of risk of violence.'5 Other factors include age, gen-
der, marital history, economic status, and education.
94
Experiencing psychotic symptoms may also be a factor in violent
behavior. 7 Accordingly, it is not the existence of a diagnosis of
mental illness that causes violence. "Relating to persons as if they
represent a violence threat simply because of their history of illness
or hospitalization represents a grave personal injustice .... "198
To reach the point where not all people with a mental illness are
feared on the grounds that they will become violent, the question
becomes whether we can determine which people with, or without,
a mental illness are likely to become violent. Twenty years ago, the
legal question surrounding the prediction of violent behavior was
whether it was constitutional and in turn, whether violence could
be accurately predicted. 199 After the Supreme Court concluded that
it was constitutional,2 0 this led to the assumption that violence can
be accurately predicted.20 ' The most recent technique used for
predicting violence has been actuarial methods.2  But in assessing
risk of violent behavior, we must also ask what counts as "violence."
For example, while assault counts as a violent act, the definition of
violent acts could, but does not necessarily include, acts such as
vehement gestures, verbal threats, damage to property, and drunk
driving.
Workplace violence leaves the employer open to liability0 4 in
part because many assume that workplace violence is preventable
195. Raymond W. Novaco, Anger as a Risk Factor far Violence Among the Mentally Disordered,
in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 21, 23 (John
Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman eds., 1994).
196. Jeffrey w. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse and Community Violence: An Epi-
demiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER, DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 10, 32 (John Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman eds., 1994).
197. Link, supra note 190.
198. Id. at 156.
199. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983),
the United States Supreme Court held that a court may consider evidence regarding the risk
that a defendant will remain dangerous. For a discussion of these decisions, see, e.g., John
Monahan, Violence Prediction, The Past Twenty and the Next Twenty Years, 23 CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND BEHAVIOR 107, 108-109.
200. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983).
201. Monahan, supra note 199, at 112.
202. Monahan, supra note 167, at 312.
203. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 783 (1994).
204. For a discussion of the various forms of liability faced by an employer, see, e.g.,
Kristine L. Hayes, Prepostal Prevention of Workplace Violence: Establishing an Ombuds Program as
One Possible Solution, 14 OHIO ST.J ON DIsP. REsOL. 215, 217-226 (1998); Stith, supra note
177.
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and " 105and predictable. Thus, an employer who could not predict or
prevent workplace violence could be viewed as negligent. Most ex-
perts, however, agree that violence can be very difficult to
predict,206 and that the people who commit acts of violence may
not be the ones we suspected. °7 Understanding the difficulty of the
task, the American Psychiatric Association stated that "psychiatrists
have no special knowledge or ability with which to predict danger-
ous behavior. Studies have shown that even with patients in which
there is a history of violent acts, predictions of future violence will
be wrong for two out of every three patients., 208 Thus, predicting
violence accurately is difficult, even for doctors trained in psychia-
try. The conditions that are likely to increase the risk of violent
behavior in persons with mental illness are the same as those likely
to increase the risk for people who are not mentally ill.209
Others, however, assert that violence is predictable and that
there are warning signs. In an effort to predict violence among
employees, various "profiles" have emerged. The typical profile
210includes warning signs such as substance abuse, unwanted ro-
mantic interest and/or harassment, extremist opinions or
211attitudes, and preoccupation with weapons. Many experts advise
employers to review their hiring processes to assure that they in-
clude thorough background checks, verification of all information,
and psychological testing.12 Other violence prevention suggestions
205. Romauld A. Stone & Ronda Hayes, Developing Policies Addressing Workplace Violence,
EMP. RELATIONS TODAY, Sept. 1995, at 25; Anastasis Toufexis, Workers Who Fight Firing With
Fire, TIME, April 25, 1994, at 34.
206. See, e.g., Susannah Patton, Looking for Clues on Workplace Violence: Where Next?,
CNN.cOM, May 4, 2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001.career/trends/05/01/
office.violence.idg.
207. Mulvey & Fardella, supra note 190.
208. APA Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (acknowledging that people with neurological impair-
ments and psychoses are at greater risk of becoming violent; note, however, that this does
not translate into a prediction).
209. Id.
210. Some research suggests that those with less serious forms of mental illness but who
do abuse substances are the highest risk for committing acts of violence. Mulvey, & Fardella,
supra note 190.
211. Hayes, supra note 174, at 299. But see About Mental Illness, at http://
,www.compeer.org/1/a9.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (listing ten very different warning
signs of mental illness including a marked personality change, the inability to cope with
problems and daily activities, thinking or talking about suicide and excessive anger).
212. See, e.g., Karasik & Rivas, supra note 174, at B7; Stith, supra note 177, at 15.
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include establishing handgun policies, disciplinary policies, and
211
updating security measures.
Some people assert that employees do not suddenly snap out of
control but rather give signals that foreshadow the violence. 4 One
editorial suggested that employers conduct psychological testing
especially in Internet firms that "often draw talented but antisocial
loners. 2 1 5 According to one writer, prospective employees should
be asked, in an effort to predict violence, "What did you like most
about your last job? Least? At any time, did you think you were be-
ing treated unfairly in your last job?"2 6 According to this writer, a
belief that one has been treated unfairly is a predictor of violence.
Ajob applicant who had experienced discrimination on a prior job
would have difficulty answering these questions. Some people who
believe that they have been treated unfairly actually have been and
they may, or may not, have a mental illness.
One profile of a violent employee that has emerged is one who
is male, white, 35 years old or over with few outside interests, an
interest in guns, a tendency to file grievances and complaints, and
who has a drug or alcohol abuse problem. 7 Others suggest, how-
ever, that substance abuse is usually not involved and that the most
accurate predictors are paranoid, depressed, or suicidal persons
who continually file unreasonable complaints.
21 s
While many believe that people who have a mental illness are
more likely to commit acts of violence, this stereotype does not go
in the opposite direction. While an argument could be made that
anyone who commits an act of violence other than in self-defense
must have some form of mental illness, we have not adopted this
viewpoint. Evidence of violent behavior does not automatically
connote mental illness, but evidence of mental illness raises fears
of violent behavior.1
213. See, e.g., Stith, supra note 204, at 15; William Atkinson, The Everyday Face of Workplace
Violence, RISK MANAGEMENT, Feb.i, 2000, at 12 (suggesting workplace violence insurance);
Karasik & Rivas, supra note 174, at B7; Kerry Parker, Workplace Violence Considerations for Em-
ployers, N. J. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 18 (also suggesting employee assistance programs and
reserving the right to review employee e-mail).
214. Toufexis, supra note 205, at 34.
215. Editorial, Mass Murder in Wakefield, PROVIDENCEJ., Dec. 28, 2000, at B6.
216. William Atkinson, Workplace Violence, GLOBAL ENERGY BUSINESS, Aug. 1, 2000, at
48.
217. Toufexis, supra note 205, at 23.
218. Id.
219. In Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1996), the plaintiff tried to
argue that the defendant's belief that he was prone to violence indicated that the employer
believed that plaintiff was mentally ill. The court rejected this view and noted that even
though the defendants admitted that they believed the plaintiff "had a propensity for
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V. THE DISABILITY DIVIDE-THE DIVISION BETWEEN
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL DISABILITY
When discussing disabilities, people routinely distinguish be-
tween mental and physical disabilities. Although this distinction
has been around for an extremely long time, 2 0 it is time to ques-
tion whether, under the ADA, this distinction is warranted.
The ADA makes three main distinctions between people with
physical disabilities and people with mental disabilities. First, the
ADA refers to people with a physical or mental disability. 22 In so
doing, the ADA reinforces and perpetuates the idea that physical
and mental disabilities are two different states with a clear dividing
line. Second, while the ADA does not exclude any specific physical
disabilities from coverage, it does exclude several conditions that
could be classified as mental disabilities including transvestism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, compulsive gambling, klep-
tomania, and pyromania. Finally, Regulations promulgated
pursuant to the ADA contain a list of examples of major life activi-
ties. This list includes, for the most part, those kinds of activities
that are more likely to be associated with a physical disability than a
223
mental one.
A. Examples of the Dividing Line and the Justifications
In some contexts, there is a need to distinguish exactly what is a
person's medical condition or disability. To the extent that we are
interested in properly diagnosing and treating a disability, the
violence, ... that does not ipso facto connote a belief by Pritchard [defendant] that Fenton
[plaintiff] was mentally disabled." 926 F. Supp. at 1445.
220. SHORTER, supra note 27, at 1.
221. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1) (1994). The Act also sometimes refers to people
collectively as having disabilities without differentiating between physical or mental. See, e.g.,
Id. § 12101 (a)(2).
222. 29 C.ER. § 1630.3(d)(1). Note that many on this list of exclusions would be con-
sidered a mental disorder under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
William M. Tarnow, Genetic and Mental Disorders Under the ADA, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
291, 310 (1998).
223. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psy-
chiatric Disabilities, supra note 94.
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exact label to place on it may be of importance.2 24 But
distinguishing a mental illness from a physical illness may make no
sense when deciding whether someone is entitled to the
protections of the ADA. By making the distinction in the ADA,
Congress reinforced the idea that the two should be treated
differently and legitimized the division in subtle ways.
This division between disabilities is apparent in a number of
contexts. Historically, general physicians treated both mental and
physical illness,225 but today, physical illness is treated by general
physicians or specialists in treating specific physical disorders; men-
tal illness is generally treated by psychiatrists. But it seems that the
modern difference in who treats mental versus physical illness is
not the cause of the dividing line between mental and physical but
rather is the effect of the dividing line.
The distinction between physical and mental illness or disorders
is deeply entrenched in our legal system and is found in many
areas of the law.2 6 People with certain mental incapacities are
excused from performance in contracts.227 In criminal law, people
who are adjudged "insane" may be found not guilty for that
reason. There is no parallel for persons with physical
. .. 2219disabilities. On the other hand, people with physical disabilities
224. Labeling in cases of mental illness may do more harm than good. See CAPLAN, SU-
pra note 82, at 11.
225. SHORTER, supra note 27.
226. Richard E. Gardner, III, Comment, Mind Over Matter?: The Historical Search for
Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EmORY L.J. 675, 676
(2000) (providing some information regarding mental illness from prehistoric times)
227. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1) (1979) (allowing contractual duties
to be voided if obligee is unable to reasonably understand or perform contractual obliga-
tions due to mental illness of which obligor is aware). See also Ortelere v. Teachers'
Retirement Board, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 368 (N.Y. 1969) (focusing inquiry on whether appellant
could understand nature of contract); Wurst v. Blue River Bank, 454 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Neb.
1990) (placing burden of asserting lack of mental capacity on party making assertion);
Acosta v. Cole, 178 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 1965) (finding evidence clearly established plain-
tiff's mental illness).
228. See, e.g., DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (1996). The insanity defense has been around for a
long time and apparentiy was present in Ancient Mohammedan law. Michael S. Moore, Legal
Conceptions of Mental Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 27 (Baruch Brody &
Tristram Engelhardt eds., 1980). Some states have now adopted another variation on the not
guilty by reason of insanity and that is guilty but insane.
229. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1) (1979) (stating contract duties
voidable only if by reason of mental illness or defect, obligee is unable to reasonably under-
stand the nature and consequences of the transaction or is unable to reasonably act in
relation to the transaction and obligor knows of his condition). But see Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 208 cmt. d (1981) (stating that factors which may make bargaining
process unconscionable include physical infirmity that affects weaker party's ability to pro-
tect his interests).
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who commit torts may be excused from liability or otherwise
accommodated by tort law.130  They will be compared to a
reasonably prudent person with the same physical disability rather
than one with no physical disability.3' This permits people with
physical disabilities to defend on the grounds that they were
unable to "avoid the evil complained of' because of their
disability.2 2 The courts have repeatedly rejected such a defense in
tort law for persons with mental disabilities. 3 One commentator
notes that three reasons have been advanced recently for this
difference in treatment:
1. Difficulty in drawing the lines to limit excuse-based
psychological problems.
2. Difficulty in ascertaining who is genuinely mentally
disabled. This includes concerns that mental illness
is easier to fake than physical disability and whether
someone's mental problems, even if believed,
amount to mental illness.
3. In deciding between two innocent people, the
plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor, the tortfeasor
should bear the loss even if he or she is mentally
ill. 2
34
All of these reasons have been criticized and attributed to bias
against people with mental disabilities.3 5
One of the justifications for the dividing line between physical
and mental disabilities is that while physical disability is equated
with functional ability,2 3 6 mental disability is associated more with
behavior.237 Employers may believe that providing a reasonable
230. John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts and Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 95, 101-02 (1999).
231. Id. at 102.
232. Jules Coleman, Mental Abnormality, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
113 (Baruch Brody and Tristram Engelhardt eds., 1979).
233. Jacobi, supra note 230, at 103-04 (pointing out that physical disabilities are treated
differently in tort law than mental disabilities).
234. Id. at 107. A fourth reason mentioned in older cases is that imposing liability on
people with mental disabilities will encourage their care takers to carefully supervise their
activities. Id. at 108.
235. Id. at 111-113 (arguing that the courts' denial of a defense to tort liability to per-
sons with a mental illness while allowing it for persons with a physical illness is a violation of
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
236. Kom, supra note 118 at 447-448 (arguing that physical disability is associated with
physical functioning but that this is not really what a disability is about); Danforth, supra
note 149, at 677.
237. Danforth, supra note 149, at 677.
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accommodation for a person with a mental disability is, therefore,
more problematic."" "What are employers expected to do to
accommodate alcoholics, the mentally retarded, or persons with
neurotic or psychotic disorders? This Senator has no idea and I
doubt that other Senators do either.2 3 While it is possible to
visualize and create what accommodations might be needed for a
person with a physical disability, the accommodations necessary for
someone with a mental illness are harder to discern.
Just as in accommodating a physical disability, the accommoda-
tions for a mental disability might be minimal or might need to be
quite extensive. These might include flexible scheduling, private
workspace, assigning an understanding supervisor, and allowing an
employee to work at her own pace.240 Many accommodations for
physical disability are tailored to meet the functional difficulty of
the employee, such as the need for a ramp or a reader. Accommo-
dations for a mental illness, however, such as an understanding
supervisor, also help people without any disability.14 This has led
some employers to believe that they will be providing accommoda-
tions for people who do not really need them but who would
simply like a more understanding supervisor or a more flexible
schedule.
The problem of accommodating people with a mental illness in
the workplace appears more difficult than accommodating some-
one with a physical disability and, as a result, many employers
refuse to make accommodations for persons who are mentally ill.
242
In fact, the question of accommodating someone who may not be
able to interact well with others, or who makes sudden emotional
outbursts, is accusatory, or who will need to disengage or cease
work together during depressive episodes that may be brief or pro-
tracted, is perplexing. Yet, it bears noting that accommodations for
many physical disabilities seemed just as intractable years ago. Ac-
commodations for physical disability, however, have been made
and no longer appear nearly as difficult as they seemed at first.
243
238. Id.
239. 135 CONG. REc. 10, 783 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), quoted in William M. Tarnow, Ge-
netic and MentalDisorders Under the ADA, 2 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 291, 292 (1998).
240. Jeffrey I. Cummings &James D. Douglas, Personnel Update: An Employer's Duty to Ac-
commodate Mental Illness in the Workplace, SC40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 263, 273 (1998).
241. BONNIE & MONAHAN, supra note 12, at 125.
242. Huff, supra note 114 (noting that nearly 40% of human resource managers indi-
cated that they had not made accommodations for persons with mental illness).
243. See, e.g., Nicole Bondi et al., Denver Disability Advocates Have Refused to be Ignored,
ICAN NEWS SERVICE, June 27, 2000, available at http://www.ican.com/news/
fullpage.cfm?articleid=15830877-380A-426F-84B93A4C3E767DF7 (last visited Sept. 18, 2003)
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Similarly, employers may also be concerned that an accommoda-
tion of someone's mental illness may cause more work or increased
resentment for some other employee. Again, this problem is not
unique to accommodating people with mental illness; accommo-
dating people with physical disabilities may also cause work
displacement and resentment. Moreover, employers may feel that
having to deal with an employee with a mental illness who displays
problematic behavior may cause hardship for other employees who
work in close proximity and who cannot close their door to get
away. But in the not so distant past, employers also worried how
their employees would cope with hiring someone with cerebral
palsy or who had severe scarring from burns and yet, employers
and employees have survived and adjusted. The difference appears
to be that employers have gotten somewhat comfortable with ac-
commodating physical disabilities but there is a long way to go
244regarding mental disabilities. Finally, just as with physical disabili-
ties, employers must recognize that not all employees with a
disability need an accommodation. Moreover, it is only after an
employee gets past the significant hurdle of establishing that they
have a disability within the meaning of the ADA that the employer
245iis required to attempt to make a reasonable accommodation. Fi-
nally, not all accommodations need to be made; some are
unreasonable and would cause an undue hardship.
Employers also worry that if they make accommodations for
someone who is mentally ill, they will have to make similar
accommodation for the "office jerk."24 6 Under the current statutory
scheme, however, this "office jerk" would first have to establish that
he was, in fact, disabled before an employer would even reach the
question of providing an accommodation. Moreover, the question
whether someone really needs an accommodation or is somehow
faking it, is not unique to mental disabilities; it is also present in
physical ones. Just because, for example, an employer
accommodates someone with disabling rheumatoid arthritis, this
does not mean that it necessarily has to accommodate someone
(discussing tactics used by disability advocates to convince the Denver bus system to accom-
modate physically disabled riders so that today, only buses with wheelchair lifts are
purchased).
244. Miller, supra note 9, at 736 (noting that employers have difficulty conceptualizing
accommodations for psychiatric disabilities).
245. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1).
246. Sarah Starnes, Psychiatric Disabilities & the ADA: An Analysis of Conventional Defenses
and EEOC Guidelines, 18 REv. LITIG. 181, 197 (1999).
[VOL. 36:3
Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA)
who pretends to have a back problem. Similarly, just because an
employer accommodates someone with severe depression by, for
example, allowing time off, it does not mean that the "office jerk"
must be similarly accommodated.24 7
Another offered justification for the dividing line is that we can
see when someone has a physical disability but we cannot see a
mental illness. This justification, however, ignores the fact that
many physical conditions, such as cancer and AIDS, are not readily
observable, although their effects may be. Some posit that mental
illness is easier to fake than physical illness and this may be true.48
But this argument does not take into account the fact that there
249
are some physical disabilities that can also be feigned. It may also
be unlikely, due to the associated stigma, that people will even try
to feign a mental illness.250 Even if, however, we believe that more
people pretend to have mental illness than physical illness, this
does not justify stereotyping the entire group as unworthy of belief
based on the few that do manage to feign mental illness.
247. Not all the law that has developed surrounding accommodating physical
disabilities will work for accommodating mental ones. At least one commentator has
suggested that physical and mental disabilities should be treated differently because the
concepts developed in cases involving a physical disability do not readily translate into a case
involving a mental disability. Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation that Drives Us Crazy: An
Overview of "Mental Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 119
(2000-2001). See also BICKENBACH, supra note 7, at 18 (acknowledging that while discussions
should apply equally to physical and mental disabilities, his book would not because
"because there does seem to be a difference between the two that should make a difference
in what a social commitment to equality requires"). This begs the question, however,
whether there is any difference to justify a statutory distinction.
248. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
Announces 36 Charged With Stealing $1.3 Million in Federal-State Disability Payments, (April 26,
2001) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/apr/apr27bO1 .html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003) (alleging that 36 people had been charged with faking disorders, including
mental illness and retardation). But see Martin Humphreys & Alan Olgilvie, Feigned Psychosis
Revisited-A 20yearfollow up of lOpatients, 20 PSYCHIATRIc BULL. 666 (1996) (finding that all
10 patients who had been previously identified as simulating psychosis were found, 20 years
later, to have had a major psychotic illness at some point). The authors of this study suggest
that more research in this area should be done to find out why some patients are believed
but others are not.
249. See, e.g., Steven I. Freidland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 343
(1998).
250. Richard Philip, Army Craze, EZYHEALTH, Oct. 18, 2002, available at
http://ww.southwestcdc.org.sg/article-youth-sep-01.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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B. Is There Really a Difference Between
Mental and Physical Illness?
1. The Biologically-Based View of Mental Illness-Recently, ques-
tions have been raised about whether there should even be a line
between mental and physical illness. Historically, those treating
mental illness have seen a relationship between the body and men-
tal illness.2 5 ' This relationship is revealed in a number of ways
including the use of malarial fever therapy as a treatment for some
forms of mental illness 52 as well as convulsive therapies such as
electroshock. In later years, the treatment went from treating the
body as a whole 25 4 to treating the brain as the center of mental dis-
ease.2 5 5 Moreover, while for several decades during the first half of
the twentieth century, Freud and his theories regarding psycho-
analysis were mainstream psychiatry, today there is increasing
support for the position that mental illness is biologically based
2
5
6
"An array of medical studies and analyses of the brain have estab-
lished that serious mental illnesses are treatable diseases of the
brain. Recent findings and research have further substantiated the
neurobiological bases for serious mental illness."2 57 A "growing
body of research" has revealed that mental illness can be treated
successfully, and that the "division of the diseases into medical and
mental types becomes more arbitrary with every new study.,258 This
mounting evidence of a biological base for mental illness blurs the
251. BRASLOW, supra note 70, at 2.
252. Id. at 71-94 (detailing the development of malaria fever therapy as a treatment for
paresis, a tertiary form of syphilis that may cause paralysis).
253. Shock therapies included insulin, metrazol and electric shock. BRASLOW, supra
note 70, at 96. Moreover, we know today that physical trauma can create some forms of men-
tal illness, such as post traumatic stress disorder following a physical assault. Id.
254. USSHER, supra note 53, at 106.
255. BRASLOW, supra note 70, at 3. See also USSHER, supra note 53, at 67.
256. BRASLOW, supra note 70, at 4. See also The Mental Health Equitable Treatment
Act of 2001 (stating that severe mental illness is biologically based); United States
Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, http://www.mentalhealth.org/publications/allpubs/SMAO1-3537/
chapterl.asp) (arguing that this century will find the genes responsible for biologically
based mental illness).
257. Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental
Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 63, 65 (1997) (footnotes omit-
ted).
258. Id. See also DANA CROWLEY JACK, SILENCING THE SELF: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 2
(1991).
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256)line between physical and mental illness. Moreover, as one scien-
tist testified to Congress: "I can state without reservation that
research shows no biomedical justification for differentiating seri-
ous mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic
disorders of the nervous system such as stroke, brain tumor or pa-
ralysis."
2 60
One of the benefits of viewing mental illness as biologically
based is that it becomes a medical problem, thus making a men-
tally ill person relatively free of blame for the condition.26' A
biological base for mental illness eases suspicion that a person di-
agnosed with a mental illness is either faking it or could cure
herself if she would only try harder.52 Most people do not, for ex-
ample, believe that someone with cancer is either faking it or could
cure herself if she tried hard enough.
Finding mental illness to be biologically based, however, will
only reduce part of the stigma associated with mental illness;263 it
would not eradicate all of the stigma because people with physical
disabilities are also stigmatized.2 4 It also would not necessarily re
duce the stereotype about mental illness and violence.
Although positing that mental illness is biologically based has
scientific backing,265 it does have negative ramifications. Among
other things, it medicalizes mental illness. The medicalization of
mental illness, called by one commentator as the move from
259. Maria Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of Expansive
Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REv. 8 (2000).
260. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Labor, Health & Human Serv., Educ. & Related Agencies
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 363 (1996) (statement of Stephen Hyman,
Director, Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Dep't of Health & Human Serv.), quoted in Shannon,
supra note 258, at 67.
261. Morrison, supra note 259, at 9 (arguing that many people believe that persons with
mental illness are responsible for their own conditions). A recent survey found the follow-
ing: 71% of the population believed that mental illness was caused by emotional weakness,
65% believed that bad parenting causes mental illness and 45% believed that victims of
mental illness could will it away. Id. at 9.
262. SAYcE, supra note 5, at 87 (noting that blaming the brain reduces the stigma of
mental illness).
263. See, e.g., ELLIOTT S. VALENSTEIN, BLAMING THE BRAIN: THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUGS
AND MENTAL HEALTH, 219 (1998).
264. See Crossley, supra note 20, at 666 (arguing that physical disabilities are stigmatized
because of personal appearance issues) (note that such an argument only applies to visible
physical disabilities and not to hidden ones such as cancer); Linda D. Martin, Note, Affirma-
tive Action in University of California Admissions: An Examination of the Constitutionality of
Resolution SP-1, 19 WITrrrER L. REv. 373, 410 (1997) (suggesting that physical disabilities
carry the danger of stigmatic harm because the presence of disability creates societal and
personal doubts as to potential for success). See also Drimmer, supra note 8.
265. But see VALENSTEIN, supra, note 263, at 3 (disputing that there is strong, scientific
evidence for the blame the brain theory of mental illness).
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"madness" to mental illness, may suggest a change in who treats
people with mental illness. The medical model of mental illness
cedes to medical doctors the sole power to treat mental illness.267
One of the problems with having only psychiatrists treat mental
illness is the political nature of categories. Critics of the medical
model of mental illness also point out that sexual orientation used
to be viewed as a mental disorder until pressure within the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association omitted it from the DSM in 1980.26" In
order to point out the subjectivity of this decision, one critic com-
mented "Wouldn[']t [sic] it be nice if we could rally and lobby to
get the medical profession to take a vote and eliminate cancer as a
deadly disease.' ',2 This same critic has pointed out that the DSM
used to identify 100 mental disorders and now has certified hun-
270dreds more.
Treating mental illness with drugs has resulted in great advances
in treatment, but drugs may also quiet and control the person who
takes them and maintain the power of doctors, the only people
who can dispense them. 271 "In answer to the question 'Why do psy-
chiatrists insist that depression is a physical illness?' one answer is
"[m] oney, prestige and power.2 72 It is important to note, however,
that at least some of the critics of the biological base theory (or
"blame the brain" theory) are not medical doctors. 73 If mental ill-
ness is caused by a chemical imbalance treated by medication, only
medical doctors can write the prescriptions. Those who treat the
illness through measures other than drugs, such as social workers,
psychologists and other non-physician mental health therapists,
could be out of ajob.
An additional problem with the medical model is that it places
the problem within the individual's body and negates the
266. CAMPBELL & HEGENBOTHAM, supra note 58, at 22 (arguing that this has led to the
dominance of traditional medicine in the management of services for people with mental
illness).
267. Marilyn La Court, Mental Illness, A Powerful and Dangerous Idea, 5-4 PERSPECTIVES,
2000, available at http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/viewindex.php/idx/23/articles (last
visited Sept. 18, 2003).
268. Id.
269. Id. For those who would argue with this criticism on the grounds that cancer can
be fatal, it should be noted that mental illness can also be fatal.
270. Id. Others point out that the DSM used to identify 60 mental disorders in 1952,
while the 1994 version lists 410. Sharon Begley, IsEveybody Crazy? NEWSWEEK,Jan. 26, 1998,
at 50.
271. VALENSTEIN, supra note 263, at 165.
272. USSHER, supra note 53, at 153.
273. La Court, supra note 267.
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possibility that poverty, war, abuse, neglect, 274 or other social
phenomena are causative factors. Thus, the medical model may
distract attention away from the social factors that shape who
becomes mentally ill, and why. In other words, the medicalization
of mental illness turns social problems into illness.75 Moreover, if a
chemical imbalance causes mental illness, it puts the cure entirely
within a patient's and her doctor's control and absolves the rest of
society from any responsibility for mental illness."t
Critics of the biological cause approach are worried that if the
dividing line between physical illness and biologically-based mental
illness is eliminated, those with mental disorders that are not bio-
logically caused or that have an unknown cause2 77 will become the
new second class citizens.2 78 For example, New Jersey has a mental
health parity law which requires parity in insurance between "bio-
logically-based mental illness under the same terms and conditions
as provided for any other sickness.... Under this law, a biologi-
cally-based mental illness is defined as a "mental or nervous
condition that is caused by a biological disorder" and includes, but
is not limited to, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major de-
pressive disorder, bipolar disorder, paranoia and other psychotic
disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder and perva-
sive developmental disorder or autism., 20 While this includes
numerous categories, it leaves out many more such as anorexia
nervosa and generalized anxiety disorder. Finally, there is some
dispute whether a biologically based view of mental illness will re-
duce discrimination; if genetics can predict who will be born with
mental illness then people bearing those genes may be encouraged
S 281
to not reproduce.
Critics also challenge whether there truly is a causal relationship
between chemical imbalance and mental illness. While the propo-
nents of the blame the brain theory argue that a chemical
imbalance causes the mental illness, skeptics question whether the
274. Id. See also SAYCE, supra note 5, at 91.
275. BICKENBACH, supra, note 7, at 64 (noting that treating mental or physical illness as
a medical problem ignores the possibility that they may caused be social issues).
276. BONNIE & MONAHAN, supra note 155, at 113.
277. See, e.g., BRUCEJ. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MEN-
TAL HEALTH LAW 100 (1997).
278. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 89.
279. NJ Division of Insurance, Bulletin No. 01-06, available at http://
www.naic.org.nj.blt01_06.htm.
280. Id.
281. SAYCE, supra note 5, at 90.
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mental illness caused the chemical imbalance. s2 Others suggest
that it is drug companies who have the most to gain by the accep-
tance of the idea that mental illness is caused by a chemical
imbalance, curable by medication. 3 Moreover, if mental illness is
truly caused by a chemical imbalance, it is difficult to explain the
research that indicates that psychotherapy alone is just as effective
as drugs in treating some disorders such as anxiety and depres-
2814
sion.
I do not mean to suggest that mental illness is not biologically
based or that we should not pursue this avenue of research. I do
mean to suggest that even if mental illness is found to be biologi-
cally based because of a chemical imbalance, for example, this will
not resolve all of the problems for people who have a mental ill-
ness. It will reduce the stigma and self blame. It may make it easier
to ask for treatment. It may end some discrimination against peo-
ple with some forms of mental illness.
The blame the brain theory is currently popular. In a few years,
another theory about the cause of mental illness may develop or a
new treatment may be announced. Medical science has used a va-
riety of treatments, now discarded. "But what are we to make of the
fact that doctors will use a remedy effectively for many years, and
then, sometimes quite suddenly, that remedy becomes trans-
formed, by a strange alchemy, into the therapeutic equivalent of
fools' gold?"
285
Regardless of the cause of mental illness, and whether we will
eventually discover that it is no different from physical illness, the
fact remains that we do distinguish between them today. The ADA
distinguishes between them, the regulations distinguish between
them, and people feel quite differently about them.
282. Id.; VALENSTEIN, supra note 263.
283. See, e.g., VALENSTEIN, supra note 263, at 165.
284. La Court, supra note 267 (citing a study posted by the Institute for the Study of
Therapeutic Change); VALENSTEIN, supra note 263, at 214.
285. BRASLOW, Supra note 70, at 5.
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C. Concrete Ramifications of the Disability
Divide-MWhy the Disability Divide Matters
About 28 percent of the adult population in this country has a
diagnosable mental or addictive disorder.86 Mental illness touches
every segment of society; it affects men and women, children and
senior citizens,28' although not necessarily in the same way. The di-
viding line between mental and physical illness has subtle effects
such as skepticism about whether the person is really mentally ill,
and the belief that because the illness is mental, a person could
cure herself if she would only try harder. But the dividing line also
has very direct and insidious effects on many people who are men-
tally ill.
1. The Disability Divide and Insurance--One concrete ramifica-
tion of the disability divide is the lack of parity in insurance
benefits. For example, Kenneth Hess was hired by Allstate Insur-
ance Company in 1992. As a new employee, Mr. Hess selected a
long-term disability plan through Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company. A few years later, Mr. Hess became disabled and was un-
able to work. He was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and his condition was characterized as a mental illness. Accord-
ingly, Mr. Hess' disability benefits were limited to 24 months
pursuant to the terms of his policy; had his illness been character-
ized as a physical illness, the disability payments would not have
been subject to this limitation. Mr. Hess sued, arguing that the
distinction between mental and physical disabilities was discrimina-
tion under the ADA. The court ruled that it was not.2 9 Accordingly,
insurance companies learned that despite the enactment of the
ADA, it was legitimate to treat mental illness differently from
physical illness, at least in terms of long-term disability benefits.
Much has been written about the problem of the disparity of
long term disability benefits and whether this should be considered
286. Laura J. Milazzo-Sayre et al., Serious and Severe Mental Illness and Work: What Do We
Know?, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY AND THE LAv 15 (Richard J. Bonnie &John
Monahan eds., 1997).
287. Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental Ver-
sus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361, 362 (1998).
288. Hess v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2000 WL 1186262 (D. Me. 2000). See also Dames v.
Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 2001 WL 528107 (9th Cir. 2001) (challenging designation
of her disability as a mental one as opposed to a physical disability).
289. Hess, supra note 288, at *10.
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discrimination under the ADA2 ° The arguments in favor of main-
taining the disparity center around cost issues.2 9' Because insurers
make calculations based on risk, by declining to cover those at high
risk of costly illness, or declining to cover costly conditions or cov-
ering them to a lesser extent than other conditions, insurers
reduce their costs. According to this argument, by reducing the
high costs caused by covering mental illness, the insurer is better
292able to cover other conditions, such as physical illness. One study
indicated "that psychological factors such as stress and depression
may have a greater impact on health-care costs than physical fac-
tors like obesity, smoking and hypertension."295 In addition, some
commentators have argued for the disparity in benefits on "moral
294hazard" terms. Viewed this way, if insurers cover or increase cov-
erage for mental illness, people will increase their demand for
covered services although they would not choose such services if
290. See, e.g., Befort, Mental Illness and Long-Term Disability Plans Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2 U. PA.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 287 (1999); Stephen E Douglas A. Blair, Employees
Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 1347 (1999); Nancy Lee
Firak, Threshold Barriers to Title I and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Discrimination
Against Mental Illness in Long-Term Disability Benefits, 12J.L. & HEALTH 205 (1997-98); Chris-
topher Aaron Jones, Legislative 'Subterfuge'?: Failing to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under
the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753 (1997);
Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different reatment of Mental Versus Physical
Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 333 (1998); Morrison, supra
note 259; Shannon, supra note 258; Andrea K. Short, Eradicating Discrimination Among Indi-
viduals with Disabilities: Parity in Employer-Provided, Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 56 WASH.
& LEE. L. REv. 1341 (1999); Luke A. Sobota, Does Title IIl of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Regulate Insurance? 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 243 (1999).
291. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 290, at 287; Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All
Illnesses Equally? Mental vs. Physical Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End
Limitations to and Exclusions From Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits
Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 767
(1997-98); Shannon, supra note 258, at 70. One recent study indicated that parity would
cost just one percent or $1.32 per employee, according to a Pricewaterhouse Coopers'
analysis of the proposed Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001. APA Online,
Mental Health Parity Coverage to Cost $1.32 Per Month, available at http://www.apa.org/
practice/paritycoverage.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003). Others disagree, however, with this
and argue that mental health parity would drive insurance costs up by five to ten percent. See
National Center For Policy Analysis, Do We Need More Mental Health Parity?, June 30, 1999,
available at http://www.NCPA.org.ba.ba297.html. See also Allison C. Blakley, Is Depression
Disabling America's Group Insurance Plans? Mental Health Benefit Parity and the ADA, 27 BRIEF
40, 41 (Sum., 1998) (arguing that higher costs are associated with mental illness than for
physical illness).
292. Befort, supra note 290; Gold, supra note 291, at 771.
293. Mental-Health Parity or Parody, supra note 3, at 20.
294. Befort, supra note 290, at 290.
[VOL. 36:3
Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA)
they were not covered . Others put the argument in terms of "ad-
verse selection. 296 In other words, if insurers include coverage for
mental health, costs will increase to the point that coverage for
other conditions will decrease and/or premiums for everyone will
increase.97 Finally, some justify the distinction in coverage between
mental and physical illness based on a distrust of mental illness and
mental health treatment 9 Mental illness is viewed as more subjec-
tive than physical illness and mental health treatment is viewed as
less effective than treatment for physical illness.299
Those in favor of parity between treatment of mental and physi-
cal illness argue that most of the arguments against parity are
based on outmoded views, stigma, and unwarranted suspicion of
mental illness.3 ° Although parity proponents admit that including
equal coverage of mental illness will increase costs, they argue that
the exact amount of the increase is unknown.3 '° "[O]ne supporter
of parity concluded that 'It] he only distinction at this point seems
to be between one group of insureds whose illnesses manifest
themselves in socially stigmatized ways and another group of insur-
eds whose illnesses are more acceptable as physical injury or
disease.' ,,02 Other arguments in favor of parity include that it will
actually reduce the number of people disabled by mental illness
because it would make mental health treatment more accessible
and it would also increase the productivity of and quality of life for
those with mental illness.3 3
2. Using the ADA to Legitimate the Disability Division-Appellate
courts have uniformly agreed that the disparity between the
benefits recoverable by persons with physical disabilities versus
mental disabilities is not discrimination under the ADA.3°4 The
295. Id.; Gold , supra note 291, at 771.
296. Gold, supra note 291, at 771.
297. Befort, supra note 290.
298. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 290, at 288; Gold, supra note 291, at 774.
299. Befort, supra note 290, at 290.
300. Id.
301. Id.; Gold, supra note 291, at 774.
302. Befort, supra note 290, at 291.
303. AARP Research, Mental Health Parity: An Overview of Recent Legislation, available at
http://www.research.aarp.org/health/fs69_mental.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
304. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 E3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp.,
196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart, 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528
U.S. 1136 (2000) Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. Denied,
525 U.S. 1093 (1999); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996). But seeJohnson v. Kmart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035,
rehearing en banc granted, vacated (Dec. 19, 2000). Further decision was stayed pending the
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main reason given is that the ADA prohibits discrimination
between the non-disabled and the disabled but does not prohibit
discrimination between different types of disabilities. 30 5 In essence,
this means that one disability is fungible for another. This would be
similar to arguing that Title VII prohibits discrimination between a
minority and a white person but does not prohibit discrimination
between different protected groups. According to this reasoning, it
would be lawful under Title VII to discriminate against an African-
American in hiring if the successful applicant was a Latino.
In EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank, for example, the Second
Circuit addressed the question whether long term disability poli-
cies offered by employers, which provided for benefits for a
physical disability until retirement age but only provided for eight-
een to twenty-four months of benefits for people with a mental
306illness, violated the ADA. The court found that the language of
the ADA was ambiguous as to whether this was allowable.0 7 Accord-
ing to the court, both plans were facially discriminatory but the
court went on to weigh this against the fact that the employees "en-
joyed access to exactly the same benefit plans as did their physically
disabled and non disabled coworkers." 30° Therefore, according to
the court, it could not resolve the question by looking only at the
plain language of the statute.m In holding that these plans did not
violate the ADA, the Second Circuit noted that the ADA did not
"specifically condemn the historic and nearly universal practice
inherent in the insurance industry of providing different benefits
for different disabilities. ' '3'0 Finding that the practice was discrimi-
natory would also "require far-reaching changes in the way the
insurance industry does business." Although the court recognized
that Congress could mandate such a change in business practice,
bankruptcy proceedings recently filed by Kmart. 281 F.3d 1368, 2002 WL 225679
(11th Cir. 2002).
305. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island, 207 E3d at 144. See also Disabilities Act: Mental, Physi-
cal Disability Distinctions in Long-Term Benefits Plan are Lega4 66 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA),
April 5, 2000, at A-7.
306. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 E3d at 144, was actually a combination of two cases. In
one of the cases, the plan provided for benefits for physical illness until retirement age but
for only two years for mental illness. In the other case, the plan provided benefits for physi-
cal illness until age 65 but provided for only 18 months of benefits for mental illness.
307. Id. at 148.
308. Id. at 149.
309. Id. at 148.
310. Id. at 149.
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the court was "reluctant to infer such a mandate for radical change
absent a clearer legislative command."
3 1
This reasoning is far from satisfactory. First, it is reminiscent of
General Electric vs. Gilbert13 in which the Supreme Court held that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Title VII. The Court reasoned that the
world was, in essence, divided between pregnant and non-pregnant
people. Although recognizing that only women could become
pregnant, the Court noted that because the non-pregnant group
included both men and women, discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not unlawful sex discrimination. Congress corrected
this problematic interpretation by amending Title VII to make
clear that pregnancy discrimination was a prohibited form of sex
discrimination. 3
Moreover, the court's opinion in EEOC v. Staten Island Savings
Bankg1 4 legitimated the standard practice in the insurance industry
without a second thought. Although not aimed at the insurance
industry, the ADA was enacted for the purpose of "elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 31 5 Given Con-
gress' strong statement of purpose, the court should have looked at
whether this insurance practice was contributing to discrimination
against people with disabilities before approving of a practice just
because it has always been done this way.
Disparity in benefits in long-term disability plans between physi-
cal and mental disability, however, is not the only direct disparity
facing people who are mentally ill. In 1996, in order to eliminate
some of the disparities in benefits received by persons with a men-
tal versus a physical illness, Congress enacted The Mental Health
Parity Act3 1 6 but the particular issue regarding long-term disability
311. Id.
312. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
313. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (Oct. 31,
1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)).
314. 207E3d 144.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
316. See Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a
and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. 111996)). About 18 states have also legislated parity for men-
tal health care. "State-level parity laws have typically eliminated differences in deductibles,
coinsurance, and copayments, or limits on the numbers of inpatient days or outpatient vis-
its." Sharon Bee & Mary Jo Gibson, Mental Health Parity: An Overview of Recent Legislation,
(1998), available at http://www.research.aarp.org/health/fs69_mental.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003). Other states have pending legislation. Id. The recent drive in Congress to
eliminate still existing disparities in insurance died in December, 2002. Robert Pear, Drive for
More Mental Health Coverage Fails in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, December 19, 2001, at A20. This
legislation, the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, would have provided full
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plans was not addressed. It did, however, address concerns about
disparity in health insurance that typically does not cover mental
illness to the extent that it covers physical illness."7 Although the
Mental Health Parity Act ("MHPA") 31 8 requires employers who in-
cluded mental health coverage in their health insurance to cover it
to the same extent as physical illness with respect to annual and
life-time benefits, the effect of the MHPA has been limited.319 First,
employers are exempt if compliance would increase their health
insurance expenses by more than 1 percent. Second, while an-
nual and life-time benefits are covered by the Mental Health Parity
Act, the number of inpatient or outpatient care days is not.3 2 ' The
employer is still free to offer mental health services with a higher
co-payment than that required for health services for physical ill-322
ness. In addition, the MHPA covers only those employers with
fifty or more employees. Finally, many employers just violate the
law; those that are technically in compliance with the Act's re-
quirements have found ways to evade the Act's intent to achieve
parity.3
23
Some experts question whether the limitations of the Mental
Health Parity Act are really a problem. According to a recent study,
the vast majority of employers offer some mental health
parity, would have repealed the 1% cost provision and reduced the small business exemp-
tion to companies with 25 or fewer employees. Domenici and Wellstone Introduce New Mental
Health Parity Bill, available at http://www.mhanj.org/Advocacy/parity-bill.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003).
317. See, e.g., Brink, supra note 163.
318. This Act was passed in 1996 and became effective in 1998. 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)
(2003).
319. See, e.g., Press Release, Russ Newnan, Executive Director for Professional Practice,
American Psychological Association, Regarding the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act
(April 14, 1999) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
320. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2). See also Do We Need Mental Health Parity?, Idea House, Na-
tional Center for Policy Analysis, available at http://www.ncpa.org./ba/ba297.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Mental Health Parity].
321. For example, "Group Health Inc.... provides coverage to New York City munici-
pal workers. The HMO replaced its $900 annual and $1,800 lifetime outpatient mental
health caps with 30- and 60-visit limits annually and for life, respectively." This was called a
"'serious disservice to policemen, firefighters and others with high-stress jobs who may well
need greater levels of care for serious mental illnesses.'" David L. Coleman, Mental Health
Parity: A Year Later Are We There?, MANAGED CARE MAG., January 1999, available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9901/9901.parity.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2003).
322. Mental Health Parity, supra note 320. See also Coleman, supra note 321.
323. Robert Pear, Many Employers Found to Violate Law Requiring Parity for Mental Health
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at A26.
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321
coverage. On the other hand, however, the mental health
coverage offered is often far less extensive than coverage for
physical illness. As with long-term disability plans, many of the
arguments surrounding the question of parity in health insurance
center around cost. There is no agreement, however, on what
parity in health insurance would cost. Estimates range from a cost
of less than 1% to a 10% increase. 26 Reluctance to require parity
also stems from concerns about fraud. "Medicare administrator
Nancy-Ann Deparle contended ... that 90 percent of the patients
had no mental illness serious enough to qualify for special
treatment. "'You walk into these places and people are playing
bingo and eating lunch...., 327  This comment reveals an
underlying assumption that people with physical illness who do
require special treatment, would not sit at a facility and eat lunch
and play bingo while waiting for treatment if these services were
offered. Finally, one argument also offered against parity in health
insurance is that while we know when a bone is healed, it is harder
to tell when a mind is healed.328 Based on this argument, however,
we could refuse to offer parity in health insurance for cancer
because it may also be difficult to tell if a cancer survivor has been
"cured. 0 29
While it is true that some improvement is better than none, and
the law may increase public awareness of mental health insurance
• 330
issues, the failure of the Mental Health Parity Act to actually re-
quire parity reinforces stereotypes about mental illness, particularly
those about the possibility of fraud and abuse. It also serves to rein-
force the idea that health insurance for mental illness is more
costly. While there is not much federal data on this question, state
data from those states that require parity provides some basis for
324.
91 percent of small firms (10-499 employees) and 99 percent of large firms offer
mental health and substance abuse coverage in their most used medical plans.
Mental health and substance abuse coverage was included in 87 percent of indem-
nity plans, 88 percent of HMOs, 97 percent of Point of Service (POS) plans and 93
percent of Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)."
Mental Health Parity, supra note 320.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Korn, supra note 118, at 435.
330. Coleman, supra note 321.
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comparison. Maryland, for example, has a mental health parity law
and it resulted in premium increases of less than 1 percent at the
end of the first year.33 ' Finally, the mere existence of a statute enti-
tled the Mental Health Parity Act may lead some into thinking that
the MHPA does achieve parity when, in fact, it does not. Thus,
some people may be lulled thinking that parity has actually been
reached.
3. EEOC's Role in The Disability Divide-The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has also played a role in the disparate
treatment of mental and physical disabilities under the ADA. The
EEOC agrees with the Court of Appeals that insurance plans that
treat mental and physical health differently do not violate the ADA.
While some argue that the ADA works out a compromise between
the practice of insurance companies and disabled persons, others
have been more skeptical . 2
Section 501 (c) of the ADA,333 the "safe harbor" provision, pro-
vides that insurers may underwrite, classify and administer risks "as
long as they are consistent with state law" and are not a "subterfuge
to evade the purposes" of the ADA.334 "The legislative history sup-
ports this facial interpretation, noting that insurers may limit
insurance coverage based on 'classification of risks' creating limita-
tions and exclusions based on an individual's disability when such
practice is 'based on sound actuarial principles or is related to ac-
tual or reasonably anticipated experience.' 035 According to the
EEOC, in order to establish that an insurance plan violates the
ADA, a plaintiff must first establish that the insurance plan uses a
disability-based distinction. If plaintiff can establish this, the defen-
dant must then demonstrate that its disability-based distinction falls
within the safe harbor provision of the ADA.
EEOC makes clear, however, that not all distinctions violate the
ADA; it must be a "disability based" distinction. According to EEOC
Guidelines, a "term or provision is 'disability based' if it singles out a
331. Coleman, supra note 321. See also Jessica Luna, Mental Health Parity: Legislating
Equality in Health Insurance Coverage, at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/
Mental/010829Mental.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
332. Compare Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative "Subterfuge"?: Failing to Insure Persons
with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50
VAND. L. Rv. 753, 784 (1997) with Mary T. Giliberti, The Application of the ADA to Distinctions
Based on Mental Disability in Employer-Provided Health and Long-Term Disability Insurance Plans,
18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 600, 601-602 (1994).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
334. Gold, supra note 291, at 791.
335. Id.
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particular disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS, schizophrenia), a discrete
group of disabilities (e.g., cancers, muscular dystrophies, kidney dis-
ease), or disability in general (e.g., non coverage of all conditions
that substantially limit a major life activity) .'336 "Insurance distinc-
tions that are not based on disability, that are applied equally to all
employees, do not discriminate on the basis of disability and so do
not violate the ADA."037 One of the examples of a distinction that is
not disability-based is that between physical and mental disabilities.
According to the EEOC, this is not disability-based because it ap-
plies to the treatment of many dissimilar conditions and has an
equal effect on people with and without disabilities.3 3 8 As one
commentator has noted, the problem with this position is that
physical conditions also affect people with and without them. 30
Moreover, many physical disabilities are quite dissimilar.4 °
Under this interpretation of the ADA, plaintiffs cannot chal-
lenge the disparity in health insurance between mental and
physical conditions to even reach the question whether such a dis-
tinction is a subterfuge because they can never get past the first
requirement, that the distinction be disability-based.341 In adopting
this interpretation, the EEOC lost focus of one of the overarching
lessons of civil rights laws-that the focus is supposed to be on the
reason for the defendant's actions "rather than on comparisons
between the plaintiff and some other person or group.341
EEOC's position that distinguishing between mental and physi-
cal illness is not a "disability-based distinction" perpetuates
stereotypes about people with mental illness by the very agency en-
forcing the statute that was enacted to eliminate such stereotypes.
The EEOC's position carries great weight-if the EEOC is behind
336. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Application of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance, 109
DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA),June 9, 1993, at E-3.
337. Id. at D-22.
338. Moreover, according to the EEOC, although such a distinction may have a dispa-
rate impact on people with mental disabilities, disparate impact claims are not cognizable
under section 501 (c). Id. Others have criticized this interpretation. See, e.g., Gold, supra note
291, at 798-801; Giliberti, supra note 332, at 601.
339. Gold, supra note 291, at 802-803.
340. Id.
341. Note that even if the plaintiff could establish a disability based distinction, it does
not necessarily follow that she is entitled to parity. The defendant could, for example, pur-
suant to the "safe harbor" provision establish that its disparate insurance plan was justified
by actuarial risk assessment.
342. Susan Stefan, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law: Issues for the
Twenty-First Century, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131, 178 (1999) (making the point that
the ADA does not allow discrimination between people with different disabilities).
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it, most would think that it must not be discriminatory. Because it is
typically mental illness that gets less coverage, it reinforces, in sub-
tle ways, the notion that treatment for mental illness is somehow
less real, less deserving and less effective than treatment for physi-
cal ailments. People with mental illness, even if they could prove
that their illness was caused by an organic change in their brain
chemistry, could not challenge a distinction in health coverage. 343 If
a person with a mental illness needed the same medication as a
person with a physical illness, the mentally ill person can be denied
coverage but the person with the physical illness cannot.344 This
consequence may feel a lot like being written off, being of no im-
portance. Because it comes from the EEOC, it legitimates the
marginalization of people with mental illness.
The position taken by the EEOC, that distinctions by insurance
companies between mental and physical illness do not violate the
ADA, also has a more concrete result. Insurance companies are
encouraged to classify an illness as mental and insureds are forced
to litigate whether their particular disability is physical or mental. 43
Moreover, rather than focusing on whether a person has been dis-
criminated against on the basis of a disability, our legal system is
spending a lot of time, money, and energy arguing about what con-
stitutes a mental, as opposed to a physical, illness.
4. The Disability Divide--Categorization of Illness as Mental or Physi-
cal--Outside the ADA context, courts have used three methods for
determining whether the plaintiffs condition should be catego-
rized as a mental or physical illness for purposes of receiving
insurance benefits, typically health or disability.3 46 The plaintiffs in
numerous cases had insurance plans that provided more limited
coverage for mental illness than for physical illness.47 Rather than
343. They could, however, challenge the characterization of their illness as a mental
one.
344. Giliberti, supra note 332, at 603.
345. See, e.g., Fitts v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 236 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that
because disparity in long term disability plan did not violate the ADA but remanded on
claim alleging violation of ERISA when disability insurance carrier classified bipolar disorder
as a mental disability instead of as a physical disability).
346. See, e.g., Fitts v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 191 E Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2002),
opinion withdrawn, 2002 WL 32123844 (D.D.C.).
347. For example, disability plans typically limit coverage for mental illness to twenty-
four months while coverage for physical illness is not so limited. See, e.g., Lynd v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1996) (containing 24 month limitation on
long term mental illness disabilities unless the insured was hospitalized at the end of the 24
month period). In those cases involving health insurance plans, coverage was also more
limited for mental than for physical illness. See, e.g., Heaton v. State Health Benefits
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alleging that this difference in coverage violated the ADA, which
would have resulted in a loss for plaintiffs given current case law,
the plaintiffs challenged the insurers' categorization of their condi-
tion as a mental, as opposed to a physical illness.
In addressing whether an illness is properly characterized as
mental or physical, some courts have adopted what has been called
the "symptom" or "manifestation approach. 348 Under this view, a
condition would be classified as a mental illness if its "primary
observable symptoms are behavioral."3 49 In Brewer v. Lincoln National
Life Insurance Co.,3 50 for example, the plaintiff had severe affective
mood disorder. Rather than looking at how an expert would
classify this illness, the court preferred to see how a layperson
would think of or define a mental illness. The court noted that
non-experts rely on symptoms to classify illness. "[I] llnesses whose
primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual
behavior are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless
of their cause."351 Accordingly, because a lay-person would have
thought of the plaintiff's mood swings as a symptom of a mental
illness, the insurance company rightly characterized it as a mental
illness, subject to the benefit limitations.
Other courts, however, have looked at the cause of the condition
in order to determine whether the plaintiff has a mental or physi-
cal condition. The insured in Heaton v. State Health Benefits
Commission3 5 4 was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. The parties
did not "dispute that Alzheimer's is a physical condition, organic
and not functional in nature ... The insured was hospitalized
in a psychiatric hospital and the insurer, therefore, focused on the
treatment and argued that this hospitalization was subject to the
limitations in coverage for mental illness. Although the court
noted that the symptoms of Alzheimer's were behavioral issues, it
rejected this approach to characterize Alzheimer's and looked to
Comm'n, 624 A.2d 69, 71 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993) (policy contained a provision limiting life-
time major medical expenses to $1 million for lifetime but limited coverage for mental
illness to an $10,000 per year and $20,000 lifetime).
348. Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing With Our Minds: The Mental Illness Limitation in
Health Insurance, 50 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 345, 348 (1996).
349. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1238 (1991).
350. 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1238 (1991).
351. Id. at 153.
352. Id.
353. See., e.g., Heaton vs. State Health Benefits Commission, 264 N.J. Super. 141, 624
A.2d 69 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993).
354. 264 N.J. Super. 141 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993).
355. Id. at 146.
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the etiology (cause) instead. Because the parties agreed that Alz-
heimer's had an organic (physical) as opposed to a functional
(psychological or environmental) cause, it would be considered a
physical illness.56
Finally, in a few cases, treatment is what serves as the dividing
line between physical and mental illness: In Simons v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield the patient was diagnosed with anorexia nervosa.
She was hospitalized for treatment of malnutrition resulting from
the anorexia.3"° The insurer categorized this as a mental illness,
subject to the plan's limitation.36' The plaintiff, however, argued
that because treatment during this hospitalization was physical in
nature, the mental illness limitations did not apply.36 2 The court,
looking to the ordinary understanding of psychiatric treatment,
found that it meant things such as "electroshock therapy and psy-
chotropic medication."36 The court found that the plaintiff,
however, had received customary medical treatment for malnutri-
tion.3 64 According to the court, the treatment for malnutrition was
the same regardless whether the cause of the malnutrition was ano-
rexia, some organic source, or poverty.3 65 Thus, based on the
treatment, the court held that the insured's hospitalization was not
• 1 366
within the limitations applicable to mental illness.
Each of these methods has benefits and each has limitations.
The symptoms method, which looks to opinions held by lay people
over the opinions of experts, may be relying on the population
more likely to be affected by stereotypes about mental illness.
Moreover, just because a lay person thinks that a certain symptom
means that a person has cancer, for example, this does not mean
that the person does have cancer. On the other hand, it has some
356. The court went on to find that the policy was ambiguous in that it did not make
clear whether the limitations on mental illness pertained to all mental illness or only those
that did not have an organic etiology. Id. at 150.
357. See, e.g., Simons v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 144 A.D. 2d 28 (1989).
358. Id.
359. The National Eating Disorders Association defines anorexia nervosa as a "serious, po-
tentially life-threatening eating disorder characterized by self starvation and excessive weight
loss." National Eating Disorders Ass'n, Eating Disorders Information Index, available at
http://www.nationaleaingdisorders.org/p.asp?WebPage-ID=294 (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
360. 144 A.D.2d at 29.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 32.
363. Id. at 28.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 34.
[VOL. 36:3
Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA)
ease of application in that we generally think we know what are the
observable manifestations of disease. It may also make some sense
when a court is trying to interpret what an insurance plan means
by a mental illness to resort to what the ordinary person would
think when she read the policy rather than using expert opinion
after the fact.
The treatment method seems, in many ways, to be circular. We
already know that mental illness is treated by psychiatrists and that
physical illness is treated by other doctors. But how do doctors
decide who should treat whom? If a person arrives in an
emergency room, how is the choice made as to what specialty of
physician to call? Imagine that the woman presenting in the
emergency room is three days post-partum, feeling hostile to her
new baby, like jumping out of her skin, and itchy. This woman, on
arriving, had been banging her head against the wall and then
pacing like a caged tiger.67 Should the emergency room personnel
call her obstetrician, a psychiatrist, an allergist, and/or an
endrocrinologist? It seems odd to use the form of treatment to
define a mental versus a physical illness without also examining
what led to that decision.
This problem may have led some courts to adopt the cause or
etiology approach which may ease some of the stigma associated
with some forms of mental illness. For example, if a disease is or-
ganic in origin, it eliminates the guilt of the patient as in "if only I
was a better person I wouldn't feel this way." It may also relieve
blame placed on others as in "you caused my problems." The etiol-
ogy approach lets the world know that the patient would not get
better if only she would try harder and it indicates that this particu-
lar mental illness is just as deserving of treatment as any physical
illness. On the other hand, because there are many mental ill-
nesses for which we do not yet know the cause, the stereotypes and
stigma associated with those diseases of unknown origin could in-
crease. Moreover, we often do not look at the causes for most
physical illness in order to assess blame. For example, we typically
do not blame or stigmatize someone who had an accident that led
to his paraplegia so we should not stigmatize someone who had an
accident that led to organic brain syndrome. This means that we
should also not stigmatize someone who has, for example, bipolar
disorder or who has survived an abusive childhood.
367. The facts are taken from Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins., Co., 906 F.2d 1525,
1527 (11th Cir. 1990), in which the plaintiff was diagnosed with postpartum depression and
was subsequently hospitalized for an extended period of time.
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These three approaches show the way courts have tried to draw
the dividing line between physical and mental illness in cases not
brought under the ADA. In the context of insurance coverage,
much is to be gained by the insured by being categorized as having
a physical instead of a mental illness. When bringing a claim under
the ADA, however, it is unclear whether anything is gained, by ei-
ther side, when the employee is categorized as having a physical as
opposed to a mental illness. Studies indicate that the vast majority
of plaintiffs lose their cases brought under the ADA .
D. More Subtle Ramifications of the Disability Divide
1. Defining Mental Disability-As in cases involving a physical dis-
ability, the courts have struggled with the question whether a
particular mental impairment constitutes a disability within the
meaning of the ADA.369 Part of the difficulty stems from discerning
what is a major life activity. Major life activities include "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, and working."3 7 Many activities, however,
are not on this list of examples provided in the regulations. For
example, courts have had to address whether the ability to get
along with others constitutes a major life activity.3 11
The problem for people with a mental illness in establishing that
they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA is exacerbated by
the vision of a "disability" that is held by those who enforce the
ADA, that a disability is an observable, physical limitation. The ma-
jor life activities that are specified in EEOC's Regulations all share
368. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (conducting empirical study of ADA cases on appeal) and
Colker, supra note 20, at 100 (empirical study concluding that plaintiffs usually lose in ADA
cases.). These studies do not, however, differentiate between the success rates based on
whether the disability was physical or mental.
369. See, e.g., Furnish v. SVI Systems, Inc., 270 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Wood-
bridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001); Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261
F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001); and Chenowith v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.
2001).
370. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
371. CompareJacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F Supp. 2d 151, 160 (EDNY 2002) (inability
to get along with others is a major life activity) with Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105
F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (ability to get along with others is not a major life activity).
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a common trait; with the notable exception of learning,372 (and
possibly working) they are all physical activities. If mental illness is
manifested mostly by behavior, then this list of activities, which is
not exclusive,73 fails to mention any of those behaviors that are
typically associated with mental illness such as ability to concen-
trate or to have an appropriate emotional response.374 The EEOC's
vision of a disability as primarily a physical one carries over to the
courts.375 For example, the EEOC regulations do not include the
ability to get along with others as a major life activity.3 76 As a result,
some courts have rejected the argument that the ability to get
along with others is a major life activity.377 According to one court,
the ability to get along with others "is not the sort of activity within
the ADA's purview of a major life activity., 37 Another court ex-
plained that while the ability to get along with others "is a skill to
be prized, it is different in kind from breathing and walking, two
exemplars which are used in the regulations."3 7 The courts' failure
to recognize the ability to get along with others as a major life activ-
ity demonstrates the vision of a disability in the ADA is of a physical
one. Moreover, even if the court would find that the ability to get
along with others is a major life activity, the plaintiff must also es-
tablish that this activity is substantially limited. This puts the
plaintiff in a catch-22. If the plaintiff is substantially limited in the
ability to get along with others, i.e., can get along with no one, the
plaintiff may then be unable to establish that he or she is otherwise
qualified as required by the statute.
372. Learning might be associated more with developmental delays and some brain in-
juries but not necessarily with mental illness. Working presents unique problems and it is
unclear if this will be upheld as a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S.
471,477 (2001) (assuming, without deciding, that working is a major life activity).
373. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding, on facts of case, reproduc-
tion is a major life activity).
374. In Reeves v.Johnson Controls World Sers., 140 F.3d 144, 151 (2nd Cir. 1998), the court
noted that major life activities must concern an activity that was significant and not some-
thing that was merely trivial. Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that his
panic disorder affected the major life activity of everyday mobility.
375. See, e.g., 976 F. Supp. at 863.
376. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiat-
ric Disabilities 4 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/psych.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2003), does mention the ability to get along with others as a major life activities. Note,
however, that courts do not afford the same degree of deference to Enforcement Guidelines
that they do to Interpretive Regulations. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141
(1976).
377. See, e.g., Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 E Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997).
378. Id.
379. Soileau v. Guilford, 105 F.3d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1997).
380. See, e.g., Breiland, 976 F. Supp. at 865.
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The courts' inability to envision a disability as other than physi-
cal has also arisen in other contexts. A former employee,
diagnosed with panic disorder and agoraphobia, alleged that he
was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.3' According
to the terminated employee, because of his agoraphobia, his mo-
bility was limited.8 2 Given the ADA's emphasis on a major life
activity relying on physical function, this was a reasonable argu-
ment for the plaintiff. The court, however, rejected his argument,
finding that this was not the kind of mobility that could constitute
a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA.3 s3 Although the
plaintiff's panic attacks prevented him from doing routine things
such as going to a shopping mall, the court noted that the plain-
tiff's impairment did not prevent the plaintiff from doing major
life activities such as walking or working.38 4 "Plaintiff does not, for
example, claim that he was so immobile as a result of his mental
impairment that he was unable to leave his house or to go to
work."38 5 It is ironic that if the plaintiff had been unable to leave his
house or to go to work because of his mental illness, it is likely that
he would be unable to perform the essential functions of the job,
386
and, accordingly, would not be an otherwise qualified individual.
Thus, the courts have struggled to define a mental disability un-
der the ADA. This is due, in large part, to the stereotypes
surrounding mental illness. In addition, however, both the EEOC
and the courts appear to have an image of a disability as a physical
one. Accordingly, the courts are unable to envision that there are
other kinds of disabilities that are not mentioned in the regula-
tions or the Act and therefore mental disabilities are discounted.
2. The Behavior Conundrum or Misconduct at Work--One of the
ways to distinguish between mental and physical illness is the no-
tion that physical illness is characterized by organic causes and
symptoms while mental illness is manifested by behavior.8 7 In at-
tempting to deal with these manifestations of behavior, courts have
become mired in conceptual difficulties. This dilemma becomes
381. Reeves v.Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 148 (2nd Cir. 1998).
382. Id. at 148.
383. Id. at 150.
384 Id.
385. Id. at 153.
386. See, e.g., Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2000 WL 1617774 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (hold-
ing that ability to be present at work is an essential function of the job).
387. See Miller, supra note 9, at 741 (noting that psychiatric disabilities are associated
with behavior).
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evident in cases raising the question of what to do with employees
who engage in inappropriate conduct in the workplace when that
misconduct is allegedly caused by a mental disability.388 This issue
arises when, for example, an employee uses profanity in the work-
place or is abusive to others,"" is insubordinate or disruptive,9' or
makes off-color jokes and sexual comments."' The ADA is, in gen-
eral, silent on the question of workplace misconduct except for
one provision that provides that a person who is abusing drugs or
who is an alcoholic may be held to the same standards as other
employees "even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is
related to the alcoholism or drug use of such employee. '392 Some
courts have held that all persons, even those not abusing drugs or
alcohol, can be held to the same standard of performance even
when the misconduct is caused by a mental illness. If behavior is
at the crux of the distinction between mental and physical illness,
than such a position totally eviscerates the ADA with regard to
mental illness. In other words, it is one thing to conclude that un-
der the ADA, it is lawful to distinguish between mental and
physical disabilities. It is quite another, however, to say that those
people with behavioral manifestations of mental illness must act
the same as those people who do not have a mental illness. This
would be like saying that although you cannot discriminate against
a person who is vision impaired, you can hold them to the same
standard of vision as everyone else.
This is not to suggest that employers are unable to terminate
someone who makes threats in the workplace or engages in other
inappropriate behavior. If a person is making threats in the
workplace, an employer can utilize the "direct threat" provision
388. The EEOC takes the position that conduct rules in the workplace are appropriate
if they are job related and consistent with business necessity. An example includes a librarian
who frequently loses her temper at work and disrupts the quiet atmosphere. Disabilities Dis-
crimination: Commission Counsel Calls EEOC Guidance On Psychiatric Disabilities 'Enlightened'
Start, 47 DLR C-1, March 11, 1998.
389. See, e.g., Boldini v. Postmaster General, 928 F Supp. 125, 128 (D. N.H. 1995)
(brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
390. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 20 E Supp. 2d. 1120 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
391. Maes v. Henderson, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (D. Nev. 1999) (Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 claim).
392. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (4) (1994).
393. See, e.g., Palmer v. Cook County, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Polk County,
Iowa, 103 E3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996); Maes, 33 F. Supp. 1281; Sullivan, 20 E Supp. 2d. 1120;
and Boldini, 928 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.H. 1995). But see Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 E3d
1076 (10th Cir. 1997). See a/soJeffrey I. Cummings &James D. Douglas, Personnel Update: An
Employer's Duty 7o Accommodate Mental Illness In The Workplace, SC40 A.L.I.-A.B.I. 263, 270
(1998).
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and take action against an employee who poses a direct threat to
others.394 Moreover, the employer could also take the position that
accommodating this particular misconduct presents an undue
hardship.35 But holding all people with mental illness to the same
standard of behavior as persons without such an illness ignores the
fact that mental illness is manifested by behavior. We might not say
that a person was mentally ill without such behavior. This raises the
question whether only some forms of mental illness are protected
by the ADA, perhaps only those that do not make others feel
uncomfortable because of behavioral issues or those in which
people keep their misery to themselves.
For example, James Newberry was a tenured professor of
photography at East Texas State University who was discharged. He
alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of his
disability, obsessive compulsive disorder.91  According to the
plaintiff he "had difficulty cleaning himself, waking up, sleeping,
scheduling his daily routine and controlling his bowel function.397
The disorder, he testified, also interfered with his relations with
others by instilling in him excessive perfectionism, rigidly ethical
behavior and an insistence on addressing all details of his
interpersonal relationships." 39s The court dismissed his claim,
finding that he was discharged because of his work performance
and lack of collegiality. 399 The court held that the University was not
concerned about Newberry's mental illness.4f° According to the
court, this would require evidence that the University believed, for
example "that mentally ill people are inherently dangerous, and
they fired him to avoid the danger. ... ,,40' The court noted that
when the employee engages in inappropriate behavior, even if that
behavior was caused by the mental illness, the employer may fire
the employee "as long as the collateral assessment of disability plays
394. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). See also Hubbard, supra note 172, at 1281 (discussing
the direct threat defense). The Supreme Court has held that the direct threat defense ap-
plies when a person poses a direct threat to others or to him or herself. Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002).
395. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Georgia A. Staton & Greg J. Thompson, A
Practical Perspective on Employee Violence and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 ARiz. ATT'Y
32, 34 (1999).
396. Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998).
397. Id. at 278.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 279.
400. Id.
401. Id.
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no role in the decision to dismiss."0 2 The court failed to see the
connection between the plaintiffs behavior, lack of collegiality, and
his discharge.4 °5 While the court recognized that stereotypes about
mental illness could result in discrimination,4 it did not see that
holding the plaintiff to the same standard of collegial behavior
could also result in discrimination.
Similarly, Robert Steele began working for Thiokol in 1987 as a
Rocket Test Technician.4 °5 Sometime during his employment with
Thiokol, he was diagnosed with depression, and then in January
1995, he was diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder.40 6 He
was promoted several times during his first few years. 40 7 He had
difficulty, however, getting along with co-workers4 °s who would hum
"If I only had a brain," write the word 'dunce' on his hard hat,
refer to him as 'psycho Bob' and as 'a psychopath.' ,,009 Mr. Steele
complained to management on several occasions about being
410harassed by co-workers. While his supervisor noted that the
plaintiff was, in fact, teased more than other employees, he felt it
was due to Mr. Steele's being "obsessed with his planned litigation
against Thiokol because he talked about it continually."4 1 Mr.
Steele's co-workers were given training and Mr. Steele was told to
stop discussing his lawsuit with co-workers. 12 Mr. Steele got into an
argument with his supervisor and a co-worker.4 ' He then suffered a
"nervous breakdown" and was absent for several weeks. He
returned to work and was terminated one month later pursuant to
a reduction in force.1 Mr. Steele was the lowest rated employee in
his area and was terminated after consideration of his "work
performance, contributions to the team, disciplinary history and
ability to get along with co-workers.... ,,4 Mr. Steele filed a
402. Id. at 280.
403. Phillips v. D.A.E, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 1998). See also, Palmer v.
Circuit Court of Cook county, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Polk County, Iowa, 103
F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996); Maes v. Henderson, 33 E Supp. 2nd 1281 (D. Nev. 1999); Sullivan v.
River Valley Sch. Dist., 20 F Supp. 2d 1120 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Houck v. City of Prairie Vill.,
978 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Kan. 1997).
404. Newberry, 161 F.3d at 280.
405. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001).
406. Id. at 1250-51.
407. Id at 1249.
408. Id. at 1250.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1251.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1252.
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complaint alleging that he had been discriminated against on the
basis of his disability, obsessive-compulsive disorder.1 6 He argued
that he was substantially limited in several major life activities
including, walking, learning, sleeping, and interacting with
others.41v The court noted that other jurisdictions had reached
different results on the question whether interacting with others is
a major life activity.48 The court sidestepped the issue, however,
holding that even if interacting with others was a major life activity,
the plaintiff was not substantially limited in his ability to get along
with others; the plaintiff had only established that he had difficulty
interacting with co-workers but not that he had difficulty
interacting with people in general.4 1 9 Accordingly, the plaintiff was
not substantially limited in a major life activity and his claim was
dismissed.4 2 0 Again, this put the plaintiff in a catch-22. Had he been
unable to get along with anyone, he would not have been
otherwise qualified for his job. Surely, there must be some
population of people with mental illness that is both disabled
enough to receive the protections of the ADA but not so disabled
as to lose it by failing to be otherwise qualified.
The concept that people with a mental illness can be held to the
same standard of behavior as people without such an illness has no
support in the ADA. The ADA only mentions this idea with refer-
ence to people who are abusing drugs or alcohol. 1 Moreover, to
hold people with a mental illness to the same standard of behavior
as non-mentally ill people eliminates much of the protection Con-
gress thought it was affording to the mentally disabled. While
employers should not have to endure totally unacceptable behav-
ior, this is not the same as holding someone with a mental illness to
the same standard of behavior as others without a mental illness.
We do not hold a hearing-impaired person to the same standard of
hearing as people who are not deaf. We should not hold people
with a mental illness to the same standard of behavior as the non-
mentally ill.
416. See id. at 1252-53.
417. Id. at 1253.
418. Id. at 1254. Compare Soileau v. Guilford, 105 E3d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that the ability to get along with others is not a major life activity) with McAlindin v. County
of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that interacting with others is a
major life activity).
419. Steele, 241 F3d at 1255.
420 Id. at 1256.
421. The issue of whether this is justified for those abusing drugs or alcohol I leave to
someone else or a later article.
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VI. ELIMINATING THE DIVIDING LINE IN THE ADA
The ADA was enacted to "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities." 422 But it is important to understand that
the law can only go so far. An anti-discrimination statute can affect
behavior but it cannot eliminate the beliefs that underlie the be-
havior. Legislation cannot dispel the myths surrounding mental
illness and it cannot eradicate irrational fears of violence. Much of
the work to be done to eliminate the stigma and misunderstanding
surrounding mental illness is not amenable to a legal solution.
That being said, it is at least the role of the ADA to insure that it
does not contribute to the stigma and misunderstanding surround-
ing mental illness. While classification of illness is important to
treatment, it may not be important under the ADA. For example,
in order for a physician to properly treat someone having chest
pain, it is important to know whether that person is having a heart
attack or indigestion. In addition, the manifestations of disability
are important in finding a reasonable accommodation. For exam-
ple, if a person is hearing-impaired, it will be important to know
the extent of the hearing impairment to determine what, if any,
reasonable accommodation would be needed. Dividing the world
of ADA protected disability into physical and mental serves no le-
gitimate rationale and perpetuates the stigmatization of mental
illness. Many suggestions have been made, including by me, for
sweeping changes in the ADA or in its interpretation. 23 But if the
dividing line continues to exist, people with mental illness will still
be in a second-class citizen status vis :1 vis physical disabilities. I,
therefore, am making a more limited proposal here-that we
amend the ADA to eliminate all distinctions between mental and
physical disabilities. This would, at the very least, remove the bias
from the wording of the ADA. It might also eventually pave the way
to abolish the artificial dividing line between mental and physical
disability, leading, in turn, to alleviating some of the prejudice and
discrimination against mental illness.
The current statutory scheme of the ADA should be amended in
four areas. First, all references to "mental and physical" should be
422. 42U.S.C.§12101(b)(1) (1991).
423. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma & "Disability", 86 VA. L. REv. 397,
446-453 (2000); Korn, supra note 118, at 447-453.
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eliminated. For example, the definition of a disability 2 4 would be-
come "The term disability means, with respect to an individual-(A)
an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual." This is a small and subtle gesture.
An argument can be made, however, that the Act's mention of
both physical and mental disabilities is justified on the grounds
that without the specific mention of mental disability, some might
have been inclined to argue that it was not covered by the ADA.
Given the prevalence of sanism, this possibility seems plausible.
Moreover, because of the disfavored status of mental illness and
our vision of a disability as a physical one, if all distinctions be-
tween mental and physical disability are removed, some would
argue that this revision indicates that Congress did not want to
cover mental illness. This leads to my second recommendation
which is a strong statement by Congress regarding the purpose of
the amendment which is to eliminate the distinctions between the
two and not to endorse any argument that mental disabilities are
not protected by the ADA.
Third, those behaviors specifically associated with mental illness
that are presently excluded from coverage by the ADA should be
deleted. Accordingly section 12111 (b) (1)-(3) ,42 with references to
exhibitionism, voyeurism, compulsive gambling, and the other be-
havioral disorders should be repealed. There is no legitimate
reason to exclude these behaviors that may (or may not be) associ-
ated with a mental illness. No physical illnesses are excluded. To
exclude some behaviors that are more typically associated with a
mental illness is, in and of itself, discrimination. The list of behav-
iors currently excluded from coverage by the ADA would seem to
be a list of the most stigmatized people or the least socially ac-
cepted behaviors. Such an amendment would not, however,
require that a fire department (or any other employer) hire a py-
romaniac. Presumably, any fire department with knowledge of this
condition could successfully argue that the pyromania was a direct
threat to co-workers, or that it was a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation to not be a pyromaniac, or that it would be an undue
hardship to accommodate such a condition.
Finally, the ADA should also be amended to add more inclusive
examples of major life activities. As currently written, the
424. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (which currently reads "The term 'disability' means, with
respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual.
425. 42U.S.C.§12111(b)(1)-(3).
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regulations provide that major life activities include "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.''426 Although this list is
427
not exhaustive, it neatly captures the notion that basic physical
tasks are really what distinguish people with disabilities from the
rest of the population.428 Our image of what constitutes a disability
is deeply entrenched in the physical. Note that when talking about
the opposite of a disability, the term able-bodied is often used. It is
important that those enforcing and interpreting the ADA
understand that a disability can involve activities other than basic
physical functioning. Thus, the examples of what constitutes a
major life activity under the ADA can also be a vehicle for
expanding our vision of what constitutes a disability. Activities such
as (but not limited to) orderly cognitive thinking, the ability to get
along with people, and the ability to react in an emotionally
appropriate manner should be added.
Amending the ADA to eliminate the division between physical
and mental disabilities will have both concrete and abstract bene-
fits. Among the possible, more difficult to quantify benefits could
be the reduction of stigma associated with a mental disability. As
many disability advocates have come to recognize, much about a
disability is socially constructed. Accordingly, many of the problems
encountered by people who are mentally ill are not caused by their
illness, but rather are caused by someone else's reaction to their
mental illness.429 Because of the stereotype of violence, many peo-
ple are frightened by the idea of working with someone with a
mental illness. 430 This employment problem is not caused by the
mental illness itself but rather by an employer's reaction to a per-
431
son with mental illness. In this view, the problem for the person
who has the mental illness is socially constructed. This view does
not suggest that there are no employment issues caused by mental
426. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000).
427. Id.
428. Although EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act
and Psychiatric Disabilities (2000) mentions other major life activities such as thinking,
concentrating and interacting with others, courts have felt free to ignore these. See, e.g.,
Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997).
429. WINICK, supra note 277, at 106; HIGGINS, supra note 105, at 28. Note that this does
not mean that the mental illness causes no problems; it does mean that the reactions of
others exacerbate many of the problems for people with disabilities.
430. See supra note 195.
431. Id.
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illness but does suggest that many of those are imposed by others
and not by anything inherent in mental illness.3 2
A more concrete benefit of these proposed amendments would
be to help end the disparity in insurance benefits. Currently, ac-
cording to the EEOC,4  plaintiffs cannot challenge a disparity in
insurance benefits unless they can demonstrate that the insurance
plan makes a "disability-based distinction." Moreover, according to
the EEOC, distinctions between mental and physical disabilities are
not a disability-based distinction.434 At present, EEOC defines a dis-
ability based distinction as one that, among other things, excludes
a "discrete group of disabilities (e.g. cancer, muscular dystrophies,
kidney disease).43" The amendment of the ADA to eliminate the
distinction between mental and physical disabilities would abolish
the position taken by the EEOC and adopted by the courts.436 This
would not necessarily require parity, however, because the "safe
harbor" provision 437 of the ADA also provides that insurers may
classify risks according to a person's disability when it is based on
sound actuarial principles.438 Thus, if an insurer provided less bene-
fits for a mental disability than for a physical disability, the plaintiff
could now challenge this as a disability-based distinction. If the in-
surer could provide the sound, actuarial principles supporting this
differential treatment, the disparity would be lawful under the
ADA. However, the insurer would have to produce evidence that
the disparity was actually based on sound actuarial principles and
not on its best guess that covering mental illness costs more. It
could not base an argument on stereotypes about mental illness.
Although the law cannot automatically alter people's beliefs, it
can alter behavior. Perhaps in time, if the behavior changes, the
beliefs will follow. But even if beliefs do not change, amending the
ADA to eliminate the distinctions between physical and mental dis-
abilities would be at least a step toward reducing the second-class
status of mental illness.
432. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 105, at 28.
433. See discussion supra note 341 (regarding the safe harbor provision).
434. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 291, at 798-801; Giliberti, supra note 332, at 601-602.
435. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PRO-
VIDED HEALTH INSURANCE, 109 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA),June 9, 1993, at E-3.
436. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 2000); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 E3d 601 (3rd Cir. 1998).
437. 42 U.S.C. 12201(c).
438. Gold, supra note 291, at 791.
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CONCLUSION
There is no question that people with all kinds of disabilities are
stigmatized, stereotyped, and discriminated against. The ADA was
enacted to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities.
Many disability advocates have criticized the ADA, arguing that it
has failed to live up to its promise.439 Although commentators have
noted that the ADA has fallen short of the goal of protecting peo-
ple with physical disabilities, little attention has been paid to
employment discrimination on the basis of mental illness.
Mental illness is largely misunderstood. Although the causes of
mental illness are still mostly unknown, many look at mental illness
as a myth, as unworthy of belief, or as malingering. Many believe
that people with a mental illness could be cured if they were only
emotionally stronger, tougher or better people.
People with mental illness have encountered more than their
share of stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination. Some of this is the
same as that encountered by people with physical disabilities. But
people with a mental disability face a double-edged sword. They
are not only subject to the same kinds of stereotypes and discrimi-
nation that people with physical disabilities face, people who are
mentally ill are also feared because they are assumed to be violent.
Although recent studies indicate that most people with a mental
illness are not violent, the fear remains widespread.
People with mental disabilities are the second-class citizens of
the disabled community. This is caused not only by the profound
stigma associated with mental illness but also by our vision of a dis-
ability as a limitation on physical functioning. It is a widely held
vision. Think of your vision of someone with a disability. Your likely
image is someone in a wheelchair or who is blind. The ability to
react in an emotionally appropriate manner is probably not what
you thought of. Try and imagine, whoever, how deeply your life
would be affected if you lost this ability.
The vision of disability as a physical one is evident in the ADA,
which distinguishes between physical and mental disabilities. This
reinforces subtle stereotypes about mental disabilities and encour-
ages the belief that mental illness is somehow not as real as physical
illness. The vision of a disability as a physical one is also evident in
the regulations interpreting the ADA and in court decisions inter-
preting the ADA. Moreover, the ADA is being used to preserve the
439. See supra note 21.
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paradigm of disability as a physical one and to prolong discrimina-
tion against people with a mental illness. Thus, the ADA is being
used to continue the current second-class status of mental illness.
Although many of the problems for people with mental illness
are not amenable to a legal solution, the ADA must be amended to
eliminate distinctions between mental and physical disabilities. Re-
gardless of whether this distinction was ever justified, it makes no
sense to distinguish between kinds of disabilities to determine who
is entitled to the protection of the ADA and who is not. The ADA
cannot solve all of the employment issues for people who are men-
tally ill, but it should, at the very least, stop perpetuating
stereotypes about mental illness that only serve to foster discrimi-
nation. The time has come to make clear that mental illness is as
real as physical illness, it is as worthy of treatment as physical illness
and is as treatable. The time has come to stop legitimating the
marginalization of mental illness.
